



JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

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ArSSR Deputy on Political Situation, Karabakh
91AS0234B Paris GAMK in Armenian 4 Oct 90 p 3

[Interview with Armenian Supreme Soviet Deputy Aleksantr Manucharyan by the correspondent of the Press and Information Office of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] in Yerevan; date not specified]

[Text] The correspondent of the Press and Information Office of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] in Yerevan had an interview with Armenian Supreme Soviet Deputy Aleksantr Manucharyan.

Manucharyan was born in Yerevan in 1929. He graduated from the Faculty of History of the State University of Yerevan and worked in the archeology institute of the Armenian Academy of Sciences. He was arrested for nationalist activities and sentenced to 6 years in prison. He is currently a member of the Permanent Committee on Human Rights and Nationality Issues of the Armenian parliament.

[ARF] In your opinion who is running Armenia today—the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] or the Communist Party?

[Manucharyan] I think that it would be wrong to give an unequivocal answer. Today the APM wants to gain full control of government. So far it continues to want it, but has not been able to do it. At present it controls certain levers with which it can govern. The most important lever it has is the Supreme Soviet which is the supreme authority and legislative body. According to the Constitution, the executive branch and other components of government are subject to the legislative body.

[ARF] From that standpoint can we say that the entire government has passed into the hands of the APM?

[Manucharyan] That would be true in some other country. However, in our case the situation is different because no matter how much Armenia declares itself to be independent it is not really independent. Although the Communist Party formally remains only a party, it still controls powerful forces; most importantly, it has on its side the USSR with its military machine that is ready for use at any time. Even so, legal activities aimed at the independence of the republics and the dismemberment of the Empire will lead to the fading of the supremacy of the discredited Armenian Communist Party and the center.

Let me state with reference to the APM that it is very agile but somewhat timid. If it can act more resolutely and overcome itself in a democratic sense by allowing all parties the opportunity to engage in activities officially and freely, it can play a major reforming role in our history. But I repeat: If...

[ARF] Do you have any concerns with regard to the work of the parliament?

[Manucharyan] I am most disturbed by the disregard for and negligence of the role of the foreign language press.

It is very damaging to have foreigners obtain information about us not from us but from TASS or other sources. That is a manifestation of our impotence. We must break through the media blockade and hostility. The Russian propaganda machine justifies all Soviet vile acts against us by propagating all types of disinformation about us.

[ARF] What is the role of the expatriate public and political forces in the developments that are unfolding in the Motherland?

[Manucharyan] For today's Armenia the expatria [ard-ergir] is perhaps an abstract concept. The Diaspora [spurk] exists as a diaspora. The political parties of the expatria carried out work to preserve the nation for the last 70 years. I, for one, do not know of a single case where they played a certain political role in any country.

The role of the expatriate parties here will come about in the future when parties start operating in full force in the Motherland.

A clear ideological foundation is essential for the survival of political parties at home and abroad. If the National Self-determination Association, the Armenian National Independence Party, the APM, and others are pro-independence, then how do they justify their separate activities? In this area a synthesis of large social masses must take place. Only then can new and strong structures be built. In that case, if, for example, there is a Dashnak Party, we can see clearly why a second or third party also exists.

It is on this principle that the presence of expatriate parties can be asserted and justified as parties of Armenia.

[ARF] The leaders of the Armenian Republic recently declared that the Artsakh problem must be resolved through talks and mutual concessions. On what basis will the mutual concessions be made? Does Azerbaijan agree with this approach?

[Manucharyan] That, obviously, is diplomatic foolishness. Gorbachev tried to fool the people with phrases. Karabakh is not subject to mutual concessions. It is Armenia and must be part of Armenia. Today it is not a sin to talk about historical rights. The principle of historical rights is most humane. For example, if Nakhichevan is similarly considered part of Azerbaijan, that would mean sanctioning all the massacres and genocides as a means of ruling somebody else's homeland. That same argument applies to Western Armenia.

There may be room not for mutual concessions but for a temporary postponement of the solution of this problem so that unhealthy developments can be avoided in the process of dismantling old economic and political ties and establishing new ones.

Other types of mutual concessions are out of the question.

Dashnak Representative on Plans in ArSSR*91AS0234A Paris GAMK in Armenian 1-2 Oct 90 p 4*

[Interview with Shant Yakubian, director of the Press and Information Center of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Yerevan, by Yerevan URBAT correspondent Shiraz Martirosyan; in Yerevan on 28 September 1990]

[Excerpts] [Martirosyan] Could you comment on the presence of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] in Armenia?

[Yakubian] Following the 8 August 1990 declaration by the Dashnak Party announcing its organizational presence in Armenia, the ARF Press and Information Office began operating in Yerevan. In the coming months, the Dashnak Party will also have its official press organ in Armenia and will present to our people its program of activities in the political, economic, and social domains. This period is a time of organizational consolidation for us. We must also be prepared to commit all of our resources to the task of defending Artsakh as well as the stabilization of the political situation and the strengthening of the economy in the Motherland. [passage omitted]

[Martirosyan] What is your assessment of the political situation in Armenia?

[Yakubian] The defeat of the Communist Party in the elections for the presidency of the Armenian Supreme Soviet created a new political situation. The Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] took over the reins of government, and today it effectively controls the political levers in Armenia.

The parliament's work must be considered a positive phenomenon in these circumstances. Although the newly-elected parliament is devoid of a majority which expresses the collective will of the Armenian people and which plans to adopt a strategy compatible with the pursuit of our political goals, it will serve as an initial basis for the creation of the Armenian National Parliament.

The Dashnak Party expresses its solidarity with the decisions of Armenian government authorities aimed at establishing law and order across Armenia and stabilizing the political situation.

Meanwhile, our organization is concerned about three issues: Artsakh, the Armenian Cause, and the establishment of a democratic regime.

1. As of now no appropriate measures have been taken with regard to the mortal threat against Artsakh. Indeed, the pursuit of the Artsakh cause has stopped being a high-priority issue. Azerbaijan has been trying to form local authorities in various parts of Artsakh, continues to blockade the region with its armed forces, and has been threatening deportations, while Armenia's leadership has been content with issuing statements and appeals for talks and mutual compromise.

2. Article 11 of the "Declaration on the Independence of Armenia" states that the Armenian parliament "supports" efforts to bring about the international recognition of the Armenian genocide.

We must urge other governments to support our cause. The pursuit of the Armenian Cause is the right and the duty of the Armenian people. This phrase is an attempt at a "tactical retreat" and is not a realistic approach with regard to political relations with Turkey and general international politics. Tactics must not be stated in the text of a declaration. Tactical initiatives are taken at a mature moment in the struggle and on the basis of a carefully formulated strategy.

3. Our third concern is related to the proper implementation of democracy, the lifting of restrictions on information media and the free expression of the views of different political currents.

We have strong confidence in the instinct and awareness of our people. The government of the Motherland will surely shake off its political wavering and will make the pursuit of our national problems its top priority.

[Martirosyan] How does the Dashnak Party perceive democracy?

[Yakubian] Democracy literally means government by the people. It is manifested by the free expression of the views of public organizations and individuals and the participation of the government. Democracy permits full freedom to the press and other means of expression. Political parties can operate freely in a democratic system. Other manifestations of democracy are free elections, demonstrations, and rallies.

[Martirosyan] Which groups of self-proclaimed Dashnaks will be incorporated in the Dashnak Party?

[Yakubian] The Bureau of the ARF made clear to the public in one of its declarations in the past that self-proclaimed groups are not in any way related to the Dashnak Party. They have no right to speak on behalf of the Dashnak Party. Those who have unknowingly joined such dubious groups must leave them without delay and apply to join the ranks of the ARF.

[Martirosyan] What is your posture with regard to communism?

[Yakubian] Communism is an antinational ideology. The Dashnak Party and the Communist Party stand on completely different and conflicting ideological positions.

According to communist ideology, the history of human society unfolds primarily as a consequence of objective factors. The Dashnak Party believes that that development takes place as a result of objective and subjective factors and the interaction between them. Communism demands the dictatorship of the working class. Communism believes in the process of assimilation of nations, while the Dashnak Party believes that nations are in a

state of self-assertion and that their presence enriches human society. [passage omitted]

Dashnak Party on Independence Declaration

91AS0234C Paris GAMK in Armenian 5 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by N. Berberian originally published in the 12 September 1990 issue of DROSHAK, the official press organ of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF]: "Together with the Declaration of the Armenian Republic"]

[Excerpt] With the 23 August "Declaration on the Independence of Armenia," the national liberation struggle of our people crossed an important milestone on the path of reinstating its ideological heritage. This propels the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] to welcome heartily the reawakening of the Armenians of the Motherland and their progress toward realizing its political objectives.

Despite the confusion of ideas and postures on the political stage of the Motherland, the Declaration officially solidifies the common denominator which determines the true and secure cornerstone of national, political, and governmental restoration for the people of our homeland. [passage omitted]

The 23 August Declaration of the Armenian Republic puts all branches of Armenian political thought before a wall of truth. The Declaration is not inclined to idealize the past, but clearly has the inspiration to rid the national liberation struggle of the Armenian people from the 70-year aberration of Soviet rule and to renew it with the healthy political and ideological legacy of the Armenian Republic of 1918. As such, the Declaration intrinsically echoes the 8 August 1990 declaration of the ARF Bureau which described the liberation struggle of the Armenian nation as: "From the attainment of sovereign status for Armenia to the establishment of a united, free, and independent Armenia."

That is why it is essential to underscore emphatically that the Declaration is neither a document of "independence" which proposes immediate secession from the Soviet Union nor a mere declaration of "self-rule" despite the conflicting interpretations of the Declaration in both directions. In any event, the Declaration consolidates the self-ruling status of the Armenian Republic and points to the course leading to independent statehood. It does not endorse the posture of "it is time to jump off the train" of the Soviet Union, nor does it put the security of the Armenian nation in the hands of external—Soviet or other—guarantees. It incorporates a policy which takes international and regional conditions into account realistically and which is focused on building up the indigenous forces of the Armenian nation.

Indeed, the 23 August Declaration of the Armenian Republic yearns to be a common denominator that can end the modern-day polarization in Armenian political thought which has manifested itself frequently since February 1988. From the perspective of the ARF policy with regard to Armenia, that attempt provides a constitutional foundation for our course and makes the steps

to be taken by the new government of the Motherland deserving of our full support.

It remains to be seen whether the Declaration will go beyond words and whether it will propel the government of the Motherland toward independent statehood. It is by putting into practice the principles endorsed by the Declaration that the uncertain approaches lurking in it are rid of the political wavering behind them. A government of all Armenians can firmly assert its constitutional calling by deeds, in particular by pressing demands on the Turkish state with regard to the Armenian question and by standing up for the national and territorial coalescence of the Armenian people.

By adopting the Declaration of the Armenian Republic, the political world of the Motherland has, to a certain extent, clarified the confusion of thought that existed at the level of ideology and political orientation, has restored the legacy of the Armenian Republic of 28 May 1918, and has opened before the Armenian people a feasible path to build an independent state.

Dashnak Position in ArSSR Explained

90AS0012D Paris GAMK in Armenian 10 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with "Comrade" Khazhak Der Krikorian, presumably a representative of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF], by Yerevan URBAT correspondent Ruzan Arakelyan; originally published in the 5 October 1990 issue of URBAT; date and place of interview not given]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Arakelyan] What is your assessment of the climate that has been created in Armenia with regard to the Dashnak Party?

[Der Krikorian] The ideas of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] and the goals it pursues, by virtue of its pannational character, has always enjoyed the sympathetic solidarity of a large majority of our people. An overwhelming majority of the Armenian people have found the expression of their aspirations in the goals the Dashnak Party pursues. In the course of our 100-year history, groups, associations, and even organizations which posed as parties often adopted the ideas, goals, and even the mode of operation of the Dashnak Party, though rejecting the organization which embodies those ideas, the ARF. Despite Bolshevik tyranny and the restrictions imposed on the thoughts and language of our people in the last 70 years, the national ideas to which the ARF subscribes lived on in the depths of our people's soul. Thus it was natural that in conditions of comparative freedom the people would burst, come forth and express themselves in many different ways through groups, organizations, currents, associations, and movements. Even the attempts to place the ideas of the Dashnak Party in edifices which are incompatible with its structure but which are reminiscent of it in name are understandable.

Various groups which have endorsed the ideas and goals of the ARF and which feel powerless before the authority of the Dashnak Party, its rich heritage and its reputation in the eyes of our people, have assumed postures of self-assertion which disorient and sow confusion among the people with their demagogic, though ludicrous, expressions.

Some of these organizations oppose the Dashnak Party so that they can assert themselves. With false and manufactured evidence, demagoguery and mud-slinging, they want to gain a reputation by discrediting the Dashnak Party. Meanwhile, discredited organizations want to salvage their reputation by trying to find parallels between their and the Dashnak Party's political goals and strategy. In either case, such postures cannot misrepresent the Dashnak Party and its character.

Unfortunately one or the other of these methods has become the modus operandi of certain organizations in Armenia. If the few groups that are opposed to the Dashnak Party have turned into a slogan the remark that "the Dashnak Party of today is not the Dashnak Party of yesterday"—which is the result of ill judgement—others have argued with equally bad judgement that the Dashnak Party continues to operate with the guerrilla mentality of the past. In addition to these expressions which are the result of vengeful approaches, there are persons who equate the policy of the Dashnak Party to that of the Communist Party.

I think that such absurdities defy any attempts of interpretation because the truth screams from the midst of those same absurdities. Let us only say that all of these attempts, some with conspiratorial overtones and others with ulterior motives, are aimed at hurting the Dashnak Party. Who is unaware that the ideas of the Dashnak Party are incompatible with communism and that no equivalence can be drawn between them. Special and circumstantial parallels are not enough for such equivalences. After all, one can find similarities between two fundamentally opposite phenomena, but those cannot be seen as a common denominator.

On the other hand, it is hard to understand the position of the so-called "self-proclaimed Dashnak members" who have no relation to the ARF and who wish to imitate the Dashnak Party and speak on its behalf without in any way endorsing the principles underlying its edifice, policies, strategy, and tactics. It is hard to understand them because these people who should care about realizing the goals of the Dashnak Party—since they call themselves members of the Dashnak Party—are in fact harming the struggle of the Dashnak Party with their actions. A man must think about whom he is helping with his actions and what the Armenian people can gain from his actions.

One may also talk about certain manifestations of a policy which restricts the freedom of speech and thought and which is aimed at isolating the Dashnak Party. But we will do that later.

[Arakelyan] There is an unjust and untrue mentality that the Dashnak Party of today is not the Dashnak Party of yesterday. Personally this is unreasonable for me because I cannot imagine how a party that has retained the same ideology cannot be the same as what it was before, especially in the case of the Dashnak Party which never became the party of individuals and persisted as a party of ideas and work.

[Der Krikorian] I already pointed out that there are groups and individuals who have been reiterating the slogan that the Dashnak Party of today is not the Dashnak Party of yesterday. Such declarations are neither scientific nor political nor rational. Such declarations only betray the political immaturity of their authors. The term "yesterday" is so relative that it is hard to set the framework of comparison. Was the Dashnak Party of 1890 the same as the Dashnak Party of 1899? Yes and no. Yes, because the goals of the Dashnak Party had remained the same, and the members of the party were acting with the same spirit of self-sacrifice. No, because the party's mode of operation had changed, and decentralization had been endorsed over the previous centrally-organized structure. Has the Dashnak Party remained the same compared to 1920? The answer is the same: Yes and no. No, because the political conditions have changed. Yes, because its goals have remained the same in terms of ideology, decentralized mode of operation, strategic principles and, most importantly, its moral concepts and its spirit. Finally, what does it mean to remain the same in public life? In public life ossification is an expression of reactionism; living bodies grow and develop, renew themselves in the process of development, adapt themselves to the times, and give new interpretations to realities. The Dashnak Party is an active party. Strongly attached to its basic principles, unchanging moral standards and Dashnak spirit, the Dashnak Party has reformulated its policy and strategy in accordance with the spirit of the times and the supreme interests of the Armenian people. If the undertaking of this process of development is unacceptable for some, then we can only feel sorry for such ossified minds. With its principles, spirit of self-sacrifice and moral concepts, the Dashnak Party remains today on the frontlines of defending the supreme interests of the Armenian people, just as it did in the 1890s.

[Arakelyan] How do you envisage the course that the Dashnak Party will tread in the Motherland?

[Der Krikorian] On August 8, 1990, the ARF announced its organizational presence in Armenia. As it has been reiterated on several occasions, its sole objective is to contribute to the task of awakening, reblossoming, and strengthening Armenia. It will commit all of its resources to this task. As for what I foresee with regard to the path that the Dashnak Party will tread in Armenia, I will say that it will be a thorny path. Undoubtedly, major hurdles will be placed before us, difficulties will be created, roadblocks will be erected, but the selflessness and cautiousness of our comrades and the unreserved sympathy

of the Armenian people will enable use to move forward and to take steps toward the realization of the platform which was promised on 8 August and which will be published soon. Reserving for itself every right of criticism, the Dashnak Party will make all of its resources

available to the government of the Motherland and will support all the steps it takes in the interests of the nation. The Dashnak Party will defend the rights of our people in the Motherland as well. One may talk at great length on this subject but let us leave that for another occasion.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Contacts Between Israel, Iraq Verified

91AE0086C Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
5 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by Yehuda Litani]

[Text] Egypt's President, Husni Mubarak, stated this week that contacts between Iraq and Israel have been held in recent months. An Israeli source, who has been familiar with the Iraqi issue in recent years, stated that "there is certainly a possibility that President Mubarak is right. Just as contacts between Israeli and Iraqi elements were held in recent years, the possibility that the Iraqis have transmitted messages to Israel recently should not be ruled out. They do not lack means for transmitting such messages. They can do so through Jordanian and Iraqi representatives in Europe and America who have held contacts with us in the past. According to them, if Israel does not become involved in the Kuwaiti crisis, Iraq will neither attack nor threaten Israel. The same source states: "Perhaps that can explain the meaning of the words 'low probability' used by the Chief of General Staff regarding the chance that Iraq would attack Israel."

"I do not know if contacts between Iraq and Israel have taken place since the start of the Gulf crisis. However, in recent years, there were contacts between Israeli and Iraqi elements," states an Israeli element who has been familiar with the subject for a long time. According to him, it is likely that President Mubarak's statement in the middle of the week regarding recent Israeli-Iraqi contacts and an agreement of understanding between Iraq and Israel that includes, among other things, the transfer of a half million Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to Kuwait, is based on "old material"; [i.e.,] contacts [in recent years] between the same elements from the two countries, with which President Mubarak was only acquainted, but through whom he did not mediate.

"In the same period," states the Israeli element, "and I am talking about contacts that were held last year as well, the probes were actually initiated by Iraq. The Israeli elements did not require Mubarak's services or the services of another mediator," continues the same source. "The probes took place in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East." The same source continues: "The Iraqis then belonged to a completely different alliance of states—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, which stood opposite the rejectionist states, namely Libya, Syria, and Yemen."

The same Israeli source states that President Mubarak and the Americans knew about these contacts and welcomed them. During the same period, the United States and Egypt perceived Iran as the great enemy. They regarded as positive any sign of rapprochement between Iran's enemy and Israel.

The Iraqis, he continues, were not interested at the time in the supply of weapons and ammunition, which they received in abundance from European sources, mainly from France, and indirectly from the Americans. The Iraqis were interested in the suspension of any connection between Iran and Israel, and, parallel to that, or in exchange for that, to join the Egyptian peace initiative. Like the Egyptians, they conditioned joining the initiative on an Israeli agreement to withdraw from the territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state or entity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In contacts with Israeli elements, they sought primarily to attempt to neutralize Iran through its arms supply sources. There were Israeli elements that knew of these contacts and attempted to thwart them. They made use of a lobby in Jerusalem to constantly argue that Israel must maintain its direct channel with Iran even in the most difficult times.

The cease-fire between Iran and Iraq actually brought about the extinguishment of the contacts, states an Israeli element. Although Saddam Husayn himself did not participate in any contact of this type, it was clear in the course of these developments that he was a full partner to them, and that they would not have been held without his knowledge and agreement.

Saddam, continues the same source, is an excellent tactician. Saddam's most important objective is to survive and maintain the occupation of Kuwait. His goal in the next stage is to become the leader of the Arab world. Just as he held contacts with Israel in the past, he would not hesitate now to employ this tactic if he thought that it would help him achieve these objectives.

Saddam knows that the concentrations of the U.S. Army in the gulf are not a permanent factor in the Middle East, whereas Israel is located in the heart of the region, continues the security expert. Because Saddam is an excellent chess player, and, as far as he is concerned, the objective is the determining factor—and the main objective is not Israel's destruction, but his own survival and subsequently his assumption of the leadership of the Arab world—he is certainly likely to make use of Israel in this stage despite all of his threatening declarations. However, his problem is that Israel knows that the Kingdom of Jordan no longer actually exists. It is at most an Iraqi satellite. Therefore, whoever thinks that 700 kilometers separate Israel's border from that of Iraq is mistaken. The border between us and Iraq is now the Jordan River.

It is known, for example, continues the expert, that King Husayn has attempted tirelessly to mediate between the United States and Iraq. Initially, Saddam gave King Husayn to understand that he would agree to a withdrawal under certain conditions. However, in recent weeks, Saddam has not wanted to hear about withdrawal from Kuwait. He knows that a withdrawal would actually mean his end. King Husayn has heard this explicitly

from Saddam, and he has since been profoundly depressed, even though he outwardly continues his mediation efforts.

The Israeli expert states that elements in Israel that are in charge of assessing the probability of war differ with one another regarding the chances of war breaking out. While the Chief of General Staff, Dan Shomron, stated this week that the probability of the outbreak of war is low, other appraisal elements have stated that the chances of the outbreak of a battle in the Gulf are high. The specified date: the beginning of next month.

All Israeli elements with whom I spoke agree that frequent contacts were held with senior Iraqi representatives in the distant and recent past. All agree that the dialogue channels that were consequently created still exist, and that both sides can use them. Did Saddam or Israel make use of them in the past two or three months? Three experts who were asked this question for the purpose of this article assume that a "signals test" was held in recent months. Details of this, he [sic] states, will become known months or years in the future, if at all.

Saudis Said Pushing for War in Winter

91AE0086A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 30 Sep 90 p 7

[Article by Avner Tavuri]

[Text] New York—Officially, the pleasant-faced Saudi spokesmen, who speak English fluently and wear white galabias and kaffiyehs, continue to make moderate and pleasing remarks. However, unofficially, a Saudi offensive against Washington has recently begun with the goal of convincing the American administration to attack Iraq, and quickly. The main reason for the pressure comes from an unexpected direction. In March, hundreds of thousands of Muslims throughout the world will begin the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. In March and April, many thousands of believing Muslims, enveloped in the religious fervor of performing the commandments of the Hajj, will be concentrated in Saudi Arabia. Someone in the royal palace in Riyadh woke up one morning, bathed in perspiration, thinking about what could happen when this stream of believers encounters thousands of foreign soldiers in the holy land.

One does not have to be a prophet to guess what delicacies the religious preachers will make of the presence of desecraters of Islam so close to the Islam's most sacred shrine, and what these preachers are liable to incite the mass of pilgrims to do. The clear conclusion, in the Saudis' view, is that everything must be concluded by March, so that U.S. soldiers will be on their way home when the stream of pilgrims begins. For that to happen, the timetable must become very compressed. The Saudis are talking in terms of a blitzkrieg war. However, they also know that a blitzkrieg war could become dirty, and that time must be left as a safety margin. They therefore want to see the war happen in December and no later.

The Saudis are also sensitive to the mood in America. Although the increased quantities of oil which they are producing cover the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti production (actually the quantity of oil now being produced equals the quantity that was produced before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait), oil prices in the United States have been rising constantly, exceeding \$37 per barrel. The coming winter will bring a substantial increase in heating and transportation costs. This uncertainty is creating a feeling of insecurity, and the United States is being pushed increasingly into an economic recession. The Saudis are concerned that American public opinion will begin to be hostile toward their cause and press for the exit of American forces from the Gulf, even without Saddam Husayn's withdrawal from Kuwait. They fear that a protracted, expensive stay of thousands of inactive American soldiers in the desert sands will damage President Bush's popularity and his ability to continue maintaining this entire army so far from the fields of Virginia.

The Saudis are concerned that their fate would become sealed if the United States evacuates its forces from the Persian Gulf without eliminating the Iraqi army: Husayn would wait for another opportunity, which would not be long in coming, to invade Saudi Arabia. The world would not respond as it has, and the Saudi royal dynasty would come to an end. Saudi Arabia's representative in the United Nations states that he has no doubt that if not for the United States' dispatch of an army to his country, Iraq would have invaded it. He criticizes the naivete of the Kuwaitis, who, despite being warned of a possible invasion, preferred to attempt to solve the crisis within the family and did not invite the United States to come to their defense.

He states that if not for the pride and naivete of the Kuwaitis, matters would appear somewhat differently now. The current reality is that Iraq is systematically destroying Kuwait, and the Saudis are worried that there will not be much to salvage there. They are concerned about reports that the Iraqis are now massively laying mines in the oil fields and on the beaches and highways. They are worried that the freedom to take military action is becoming more limited with the passing of each day. Therefore, they want to see the American war machine pulling the trigger. The Saudis view the military option as follows: A bruising blow dealt by the U.S. Air Force would break, in their opinion, Saddam Husayn's army. They are circulating appraisals to the effect that the Iraqi Army is not as strong as Saddam Husayn declares, and that a massive air attack would be sufficient to end his rule.

They speak in terms of several days being needed to subdue the Iraqi Army. For public relations purposes, Saudi spokesmen continue to speak of the need to solve the crisis peacefully. However, unofficially they are clarifying that any solution not resulting in the elimination of the Iraqi war machine and the removal of Saddam Husayn would not be adequate to restore stability in the Persian Gulf. A withdrawal from Kuwait by Iraq would not be enough.

The caustic threats made by Saddam Husayn in his speech recorded for the American nation, the fact that Palestinian terrorist organizations have joined the call to strike at American targets, and concerns for Jordan's fate, which continues to seesaw, were recorded this week in Washington as indications that the possibilities for solving the crisis without a military clash are becoming increasingly restricted. Many here are beginning to seriously think that war is now inevitable.

Possible Outcomes If Saddam Falls

91AE0068B Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Oct 90 p 12

[Article by Yisra'el Landers]

[Text] Following the establishment of the state, we have been tried by an average of one war per decade. The terrors of war are well known to us. We usually prefer to settle conflicts with political means. However, most experts in Israel believe that this rule does not apply to the Persian Gulf crisis. In the case of the current gulf crisis, a political settlement would be more dangerous than a military settlement.

As is known, President Bush has demanded the evacuation of Kuwait by the Iraqi Army and the restoration of the rule of the Al Sabah family. An expression by Saddam Husayn of willingness in principle to respond to these demands would outwardly appear to be a victory for the American administration and the international community. However, such a political settlement, which would seem, as it were, to be a submission on the part of Saddam Husayn, would cause, in the opinion of knowledgeable sources, malignant results from the standpoint of peace in the Middle East and the stability of the world economy.

Under the scenario of a political solution, the Iraqi war machine, in all of its strength, would continue to be at the disposal of an unrestrained tyrant who threatens the entire region. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates would be afraid to oppose the demands made by Saddam, whose power could not even be broken by the premier superpower. The Arab masses inside and outside of Iraq would regard Saddam as a victorious hero—the reincarnation of Nebuchadnezzar and Salah-al-Din, as it were, in a single person. The new hero would certainly not miss an opportunity to stir up the Arab states and topple their regimes. Not only would he have Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt in his sights, but also Jordan, which currently supports Iraq. Because the liberation of Palestine is the slogan that unifies the Arab world, it can be assumed that Israel would be the next target of Saddam's aggression. Even if an American presence remains in the gulf region for a long time, a political settlement without the breaking of Saddam's power would be a sure recipe for the next crisis, which would not be long in coming.

It is no wonder then that Saddam wants a political settlement. President Bush also prefers a settlement without war. Nonetheless, the chances of that happening seem very meager, and not only because of the absence of

any sign of flexibility in Saddam's positions. Brigadier General (reserves) Dr. Hayim Yavitz, a strategic planning expert who was responsible for appraising the national situation of AMAN [Bureau of Military Intelligence], states that Iraq and the alliance of forces that opposes it have already passed the point of no return on the way to a military conflagration. The Western countries, the Soviet Union, and China have joined the action against Iraq for the sake of world economic stability, which is vital to the West's prosperity and the East's economic rehabilitation. The continued rule of Saddam Husayn would inflame negative tendencies in the Middle East and undermine stability. Therefore, these countries, including the Soviet Union, are interested in a military solution that would destroy Saddam's rule. This is also desired, according to Yavitz, by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt. However, the offensive option of the United States has yet to mature, pending the completion of the buildup of U.S. ground forces in the Gulf. (It is estimated that at least another several weeks are needed to complete the buildup). The administration will exploit the ongoing state of waiting to prove that it really has no political option, and to mobilize additional international support for military action.

From Iraq's point of view, the economic blockade has yet to cause insufferable distress; it seems that Iraq will be able to bear the blockade for six or more months. If Iraq initiates a military operation in the near future, it would not be motivated by its economic distress, but by the growing fear of a U.S. military initiative and its desire to intercept it. However, at present, Saddam is interested in preventing a military conflict.

It is difficult to know what would be the immediate cause of a conflagration: a strike against Saudi oil installations or an Iraqi tanker, a limited provocation, or a large-scale attack. In any case, well-informed sources state that Iraq is liable to make good on its threat to entangle Israel in the battle as a means of presenting the coalition arrayed against it as an imperialist-Zionist alliance, which the entire Arab world must oppose. Nonetheless, Yavitz thinks that Saddam would not succeed in dragging Israel into the battle. The United States and its allies would do everything possible to thwart such a scheme. They would respond quickly to any Iraqi provocation against Israel to deny Israel a pretext for involvement, which they are very keen to prevent.

The prevailing opinion is that if war breaks out, Iraq would be defeated, which would put an end to Saddam's rule. According to Yavitz, the estimation of the Iraqi Army's power is greatly exaggerated. If the United States and its allies use their forces according to the systems [organic] concept of the modern battlefield, a quick subdual can be expected. "The Americans could exploit their air superiority to destroy massive targets from a distance. In the next phase, ground forces could be employed to advance against, and fragment, the Iraqi Army. The desert in the gulf area is not similar to Vietnam. Iraqis exposed to American fire without air cover will flee like the Egyptians did in the Six Day War.

Arab spearhead units would certainly be at the head of the advancing forces. They would demonstrate that the Arabs, not the Americans, are to dictate to Iraq the terms of its surrender. Yavitz indicates that the Americans and the Syrians are very concerned about Iranian involvement in the war. The Iranians are liable to exploit the fragmentation of the Iraqi Army to invade Iraq and gain control over its Shi'ites. In justifying their invasion, they could claim that they want to contain the spread of American imperialism. The Soviet Union, Britain, and Syria, and perhaps China, have recently made energetic diplomatic efforts to deter Iran from such a course, which could lead to an Arab-Iranian war.

A successful military battle against Iraq would have several desirable results from the Israeli viewpoint:

- A strong strike against Iraqi power, which threatens the region's stability and Israel's security: Yavitz states that a political settlement of the Gulf crisis would raise the degree of danger posed to Israel to six to eight on a scale of ten, because it would result in the consolidation of an eastern front against Israel. A strong military strike against Iraq would lower that threat to two on the scale.
- The weakening of radical elements in the region that aspire to liquidate Israel, a diminishing of the PLO's political status, and in contrast, the strengthening of leaders of the moderate Arab camp.
- The stabilization of the economic system and the determination of oil prices according to market forces.
- A gain for the "free world" under the leadership of the United States and a warning sign to unrestrained tyrants.

Negative results from an expected military battle can also be expected: In large parts of the Arab world, hatred of the West and Israel would increase, especially if the Iraqis absorb heavy losses. The incentive to carry out terror operations against Israel and the West would grow. In the Arab states that have joined the American camp, for example Egypt, the opposition would escalate its struggle against the government, undermining its stability. Some experts believe that Israel would face a grave danger if there were to arise in Iraq a new regime that would reach an understanding with al-Asad to form an eastern front. (Yavitz has reservations regarding this appraisal, stating that a new ruler in Iraq would have to devote himself to consolidating his position and would not be free for a confrontation with Israel). In gratitude to the Arab countries that would help in the war against Iraq, the West would be likely to supply them with combat means that would undermine the arms balance to Israel's disadvantage. For that reason, it could be expected that the Arab-Israeli conflict would once again rise on the international agenda. The trend would be toward settling the conflict on the basis of a broad international agreement that would be liable to be closer to the Arabs' position than to Israel's position. Yavitz states that if Israel wishes to act wisely, it should take the initiative in endeavoring to win the support of the major powers for its own plan. If Israel becomes reconciled

with the current political freeze, it is liable to be subjected to pressures to reach an agreement that would be undesirable from its standpoint.

Nonetheless, the risks inherent in a military battle should not be disregarded. Overall, a military solution is several times more preferable than a political settlement. Despite the current tension, Yavitz thinks that there is no justification for the gloomy atmosphere. Saddam's entanglement is a great miracle that has happened to Israel. However, the beneficiary of the miracle does not always recognize the miracle.

AL-MAJALLAH Profiles Media Coverage of Gulf Crisis

Aspects of Propaganda War

91AE0032A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
26 Sep 90 pp 50-51

[Article by Ibrahim 'Awad: "Propaganda War"]

[Text] If the Kuwait liberation battle has not yet begun militarily, it has been active informationally as of the moment of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. When the world condemned the invasion crime through the Security Council and the United Nations, the media had to move on all political and military fronts, beginning with exposure of the invaders' barbarism as of the moment of their invasion of Kuwait and of the subsequent movements at the highest Arab and international levels. The latest indication of the media's participation in the Kuwait liberation war is what U.S. President George Bush did when he entered every Iraqi home through the message which he delivered to Baghdad and which was broadcast on Iraqi television. In the message, the president addresses the Iraqi people, warning them that they "stand on the brink of war because Saddam Husayn has misled his nation and convinced it to invade Kuwait. He has told you that this crisis is an Iraqi struggle against the United States. The fact is that Iraq stands against the entire world." In the initial days of the invasion, Egyptian President Mubarak summoned the journalists in order to call for holding an emergency session to settle the crisis through dialogue between the brothers, declaring that such a session is the final chance, else it would be the deluge.

But Iraq wasted the "last chance" and persisted in its aggression and its concentrations. The Arab and friendly armies moved to participate in defending the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to protect its territories and citizens at the request of King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, the custodian of the two holy mosques. This situation has led to creating a major catastrophe embodied in evicting Kuwaitis from their land, in threatening and dispersing them in all parts of the world, and in killing a large number of them. This is in addition to the eviction and the escape from Baghdad and Kuwait of millions of workers, employees, and families who have been

dumped in the desert on the Jordanian borders, plus other tragedies and pains that have afflicted in one way or another every Arab who has seen one Arab country being usurped by a neighboring Arab country even though the former stood with the latter in its years of hardship, tribulation, and want.

In the face of these conditions and developments, the Arab and foreign media have had to mobilize all their institutions and agencies and to convey to the reader, the listener, and the viewer the details of every step, be it military or diplomatic, emanating from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. These media have also had to confront the misleading counter media, whether coming from Baghdad or from some opportunists, vacillators, or two-faced and fork-tongued people.

AL-MAJALLAH has observed the media movement through a number of Arab and foreign news agencies, papers, and radio and television stations. It has interviewed their officials and has familiarized itself with their work mechanism, with the difficulties they encounter, and with how they overcome them amidst the tumultuous and rapid developments that have turned the media people into something very akin to a mobilized soldier on the front.

Journalists Enter Syria

91AE0032B *London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic*
26 Sep 90 p 54

[Article by Khalil al-Taqi: "Syria: 350 Arab and Foreign Journalists Enter in One Month"]

[Text] Syria has experienced energetic media activity since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, especially since Syria sent its forces to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in implementation of the Cairo summit resolutions and at the request of King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, the custodian of the two holy mosques, to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Media activity reached its peak during U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Damascus and his meeting with President Hafiz al-Asad and a number of prominent Syrian officials. This visit was preceded by visits by a number of Arab ministers. Moreover, hundreds of foreign journalists arrived in Damascus to cover the release of Irish hostage Brian Keenan who was handed over to the Syrian authorities in Beirut.

Dr. Sabir Falhut, the general director of the SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY (SANA) spoke about how the agency has kept pace with the events in the region and how it has observed the developments that carry something new from day to day, not to say hour to hour.

Dr. Falhut has said: "SANA, which transmitted the first international report on the Iraqi forces' invasion of Kuwait, has intensified its activity and has drawn up a special work plan to carry out the duties imposed by this special emergency condition in the Arab homeland which has emanated from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Our

correspondents in the various Arab and foreign capitals have been energetically sending reports, comments, impressions, and public opinion surveys in the countries where they work. The central department's specialized sections have been working energetically, receiving and scrutinizing information and reports, and transmitting them to the Syrian media, be they the press or radio and television. As is its wont, SANA has sought to steer as clear as possible of exaggeration and has been eager for accuracy and for whatever heals the rift, whatever consoles, and whatever corrects the crooked hearts and positions as much as possible. SANA has sought to accomplish this while maintaining the solid stance and the firm principle from which Syria proceeds and which is embodied in insistence on Iraq's full and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, on restoring this fraternal country's legitimate government, and on not linking this issue to any other issue in the region and while continuing Syria's responsible and constant call for achieving a strong and effective Arab solidarity and for carrying on with the struggle with various means to liberate all the occupied Arab territories and to regain the Palestinian people's full rights, including the right to self-determination and repatriation."

Zuhayr al-Janan, the foreign information director at Syria's Ministry of Information, has said: "As of the first day of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Syrian media have reflected the perils of this invasion, not only to Iraq and Kuwait but also to the entire Arab nation. Syria's pens have proceeded to discuss the illegality of one Arab country's occupation of another Arab country. The press, radio, and television commentaries have focused on the violation this invasion, which is unprecedented in modern history, constitutes against international charters and conventions and against the Arab League charter. As of the first day of the invasion, President Hafiz al-Asad hastened to warn of the dangers of this invasion and called for holding an urgent Arab summit to debate this serious issue, its ramifications to the Arab nation, and the invitation of international forces it has occasioned.

"We in the Ministry of Information have, of course, been and continue to be in constant motion because of the hundreds of requests by Arab and foreign journalists who wish to acquire entry visas to Syria to interview its officials and to familiarize themselves with the Syrian position vis-a-vis this crisis. We have provided these journalists with numerous facilities, beginning with granting them the required visas at the airports or entry points and with organizing itineraries for them to visit the various parts of Syria and ending with securing interviews for them with the high-ranking officials. For example, a total of 350 Arab and foreign journalists visited Syria in the past month of August."

Kuwaiti Media Reaction

91AE0032C *London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic*
26 Sep 90 pp 52-54

[Article by Bari'ah 'Alam-al-Din: "Kuwait: Quick Breather and Confronting 'Hulago,' Dr. Muhammad

al-Rumayhi: We Are not Agitating Press; Is There Agitation After Invasion of Kuwait"]

[Text] "The work hours last 12, perhaps 14, hours daily. Lunch is eaten at the office, and the work is seven days weekly." While biting into a red apple he holds in his left hand and busily writing notes on a paper in front of him, Dr. Muhammad al-Rumayhi, chief editor of AL-QABAS AL-DUWALI, added: "More than anything else, Kuwait is a word, a newspaper, a magazine, a publication, and a book. The invasion forces have occupied Kuwait, the land. But they cannot occupy the word and they cannot defeat or enslave the word or make it a hostage of the tyrant of Baghdad."

The hour is 1400 at AL-QABAS AL-DUWALI office in London. The small editorial staff is having lunch, each member sitting at his desk and biting into a hamburger while poet 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Najjar, the author of the "Moving Quartet" hums the verses:

"While the homeland inspires hope and converses with the moons; with learning, knowledge, and abundance filling the land; 'Hulago' came to devastate the land; O war criminal, who can extinguish the moons!"

Kuwait's information "moons" were numerous. "We had more than 20 weeklies and monthlies and five Arabic and two English dailies," said poet al-Najjar, adding: "The KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY (KUNA) spread an information umbrella which covered the entire world. Barjas Muhammad al-Barjas, the chairman of KUNA's Board of directors, continues to be like the olympic torch. His fire is never extinguished."

When "Hulago arrived," these moons were turned off over Kuwait's sky only to be lighted in other parts of this world.

AL-QABAS AL-DUWALI moved to be published in London. AL-ANBA' resumed publishing in Cairo, AL-SIYASAH resumed publishing in Jeddah, and AL-WATAN continues to look for a site, mostly in the Gulf, and so is AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM.

Dr. al-Rumayhi has said: "We are fighting media. We have no option but to fight. This option is white and is tinged by no streak of blackness. We are for Kuwait, and we support whoever is for Kuwait. We are against whoever is opposed to Kuwait. Kuwait is the compass that cannot miss."

Is it media in exile?

Dr. al-Rumayhi is not pleased with the phrase "in exile" and responds immediately:

"Homeland is the human being. The homeland is the Kuwaiti citizen, wherever he may be. Nowadays, our people are either garrisoned at home or stand fast abroad. In both cases, we reach them and communicate with them. We are printed in London and Cairo, in New York and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and in Marseilles. We convey Kuwait's concerns to the world,

and we convey to the Kuwaiti citizen the world's interest in him and in his just cause. Because our weapon in confronting the invasion hordes is the word, we always arrive. The world is small, and the word cannot be obstructed by a tank or killed by a bullet."

AL-QABAS AL-DUWALI was published a few weeks ago—to be specific, 10 days after Kuwait was invaded—in four pages. Two weeks later, it grew to eight pages.

What is the number of the editorial staff members?

Dr. al-Rumayhi smiles, saying: "You can count them on the fingers of one hand."

He added: We are not a conventional press. When one advocates a just and clear cause, then one's store of sacrifice is inexhaustible. We here are a "kitchen." The real editorial staff is large and is divided in nearly all capitals. We have a fax machine. In fact, we have two. Reception goes on day and night without interruption. The same goes for the telephones. It is as if every Kuwaiti, not to say every Arab, has turned into a mobile news agency. We have KUNA, the actual editorial staff.

But AL-QABAS AL-DUWALI seems at times to be close to agitation. Let us say that it is "extremely hot!"

Dr. al-Rumayhi proceeds to interrupt, saying: Agitation? Now that the Iraqi forces have invaded Kuwait, is there still any such thing as agitation? The reality is richer than any imagination. Arab forces have invaded an Arab country, occupied its land, massacred its people, and seek to devoid it of its citizens finally. Can we deal with such a problem "coolly," even if we were not Kuwaiti citizens? Don't you feel that your Arab values, your pan-Arab values, and your humanitarian values have been shaken?

With the gushing words, one recalls that Dr. al-Rumayhi was chief editor of AL-'ARABI magazine which was published in Kuwait before the occupation. AL-'ARABI was not so much a symbol as it was a practice entrenched by the Arab character of its articles and reports. AL-'ARABI was Arab, not Kuwaiti in the narrow sense of belonging.

Is it the bitterness and the feeling that one has been stabbed in the back that adds a note of pain to Dr. al-Rumayhi's words—a note which one finds in AL-QABAS AL-DUWALI, in AL-ANBA', in AL-SIYASAH, and perhaps in the conversations of all Kuwaitis?

Dr. al-Rumayhi answers frankly: "Rest assured. Fear not for Kuwait's people. They will not abandon their Arabism. The amir, the crown prince, and the deputy prime minister have all said it. Despite the bitterness, we will not abandon our Arabism. Saddam Husayn is not Arabism nor Islam and 'Arafat is not Palestine. Arabism will live in Kuwait whereas they will vanish."

Do you think that the Kuwaiti media abroad are temporary?

Dr. al-Rumayhi smiles confidently and answers: If I had any doubt, I would stop writing. The return is imminent, God willing.

Don't you fear for your life? I mean they are murderers, as you are aware.

He answers calmly: I am aware that they are murderers. I know their victims. They are my friends and beloved ones in Kuwait. But when the question concerns the homeland's fate, the individual's fate, personal life, and individual concerns vanish. The answers becomes as big as the people of Kuwait in their entirety and as big as the homeland.

Saudi Information Officials on Foreign Journalists

91AE0032D London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
26 Sep 90 pp 70-71

[Article by Wahib Ghurab: "Saudi Arabia: 531 Journalists, Mostly Foreigners, Present in Kingdom"]

[Text] Since 2 August 1990, the date on which Iraq invaded Kuwait, large numbers of journalists from the various world media, including the press, television networks, radio stations, and news agencies, have arrived in the Eastern Province of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

According to the records of the Saudi Ministry of Information, the number of these journalists amounted to more than 531 by last week. A large number of them have settled in the area since the eruption of the crisis.

Dr. Shihab Jamjum, the assistant deputy minister of information, has said: "Since the first days of the invasion, we have received numerous requests for visits by the media to cover the developments. At the outset, we tried to organize their presence so that they may be able to do their job and provide good coverage. The city of Dhahran and its hotels cannot accommodate this vast mass of journalists from all parts of the world. But we have been able, thanks be to God, to set up the information center with all its services and to establish the rules for hosting media people in a short time.

"Numerous programs have been organized in response to the journalists' wishes to visit the military positions and the joint auxiliary forces, in addition to meetings with officials in the various sectors."

Dr. Jamjum believes that "it is not difficult to deal with the media people because we have prepared the means that assure them of doing their job and performing the task for which they have come."

But how does Dr. Jamjum, the official directly responsible for this horde of journalists, view the reports that have appeared in their papers or in the television networks they represent?

To this question, he responds:

"I believe that they have been relatively positive. But what is important is that we are proud of our country and our accomplishments. We are not a closed society that has problems that it conceals or that it is afraid to reveal. The foreign media people have been arriving in the kingdom since the start of the crisis. They have visited facilities, interviewed officials, and toured the markets and various places, either by arrangements made on our part or by arrangements made at their request. There have been no restrictions whatsoever on their movement. Inversely, they have been given free scope to perform their task."

Some foreign journalists admit that they did not have a clear picture of Saudi Arabia, rather that their view of the Kingdom was distorted, and that their stay has given them the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the truth.

The journalists currently present in Saudi Arabia represent U.S. (more than 60 percent of them) papers, British and French papers, and the papers of a number of other countries in various parts of the world. As for the Arab media presence, "it is relatively limited, unless we exclude the arrival of a number of Moroccan, Algerian, and Egyptian journalists in organized and brief visits lasting a few days."

Implications of Syrian-Iranian Rapprochement

91AE0041A Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
28 Sep 90 p 8

[Article by Pinhas 'Inbari]

[Text] Again, the tension in the Gulf is rising, and it appears that the danger of war is greater than ever. Iraq is reacting nervously to the air embargo, and the commanders of the U.S. army in Saudi Arabia are speaking in terms of a "safe war." Still, the Americans have not yet completed their military preparation and, although the danger of war is very tangible, in the opinion of military experts, the Americans still do not have a real military option, and it will take another month or two until they truly complete their preparations.

Nonetheless, all of the developments of recent days do not necessarily hint that the Middle East is waiting while doing nothing for the military blow. Underneath the surface, developments are taking place that are changing the Middle East from its foundation, and a few of them were exposed in talks between al-Asad and Rafsanjani this week in Tehran.

When it was made known in Tehran that the visit of the president of Syria, Hafiz al-Asad, had been extended for one day, rumors immediately began to spread that the visit was on the brink of failure, and that the two presidents, Rafsanjani and al-Asad, were finding it difficult to formulate a joint statement. These assessments were based on what had preceded al-Asad's visit: significant rapprochement in relations between Iraq and Iran, as manifested by the historic visit of the Iraqi foreign

minister, Tariq 'Aziz, to Tehran, and by the reciprocal visit of the Iranian deputy foreign minister in Baghdad.

It became evident, however, that the joint statement that was finally published was so detailed, and dealt with subjects so comprehensive that the Radio Damascus announcer read it for over half an hour.

Al-Asad's visit was not extended due to differences of opinion; to the contrary, [it was] because the scope of the talks had expanded, necessitating the extension of the visit. When President al-Asad spoke extensively of his positions on various matters in the Middle East, Rafsanjani said that these positions were entirely acceptable to him, and that there was full coordination and understanding between the two presidents. It is still likely to become clear that al-Asad's visit was an important milestone, not only with regard to the Kuwaiti crisis, but also with regard to the Palestinian problem and the problem of Lebanon.

But nonetheless, and in a paradoxical manner, those who claimed that al-Asad's talks in Tehran had encountered a crisis were also right—and the talks were extended for one day, not only due to the "full" agreement with the Iranians, but also because of the extremely deep controversy.

It is possible to excuse this difficulty by comprehension of Iran's very delicate political structure—in Teheran there are not one, but two governments, one directed by Rafsanjani and backed by the army of Iran, and the second [belonging to] those continuing the legacy of the Khomeyni revolution, relying on some of the revolutionary guards and on the Hizballah.

While President Rafsanjani is pushing Iran toward the West, seeking to take advantage of the Kuwaiti crisis in order to report this to the pro-American camp, the "president of the revolution", 'Ali Khamene'i, son of Khomeyni, is finding it difficult to digest this betrayal of the principles of the revolution, which viewed the United States and Western culture in general as an enemy of Islam. It must be noted that President al-Asad consulted separately with Rafsanjani and with Khamene'i, and it cannot be ruled out that he tried to mediate between them, not only on the issue of Kuwait, but also on the issue of Lebanon, the Palestinian problem, and perhaps even the situation in Jordan.

If he only could, Rafsanjani would march hand in hand with al-Asad, and we already would be seeing the first Iranian units landing to defend Saudi Arabia. A week ago, the broadcasting station of "Voice of America" reported that the possibility was being explored in Iran of sending an army to Saudi Arabia, alongside of the Muslim forces, primarily those of Pakistan. In a press conference this week, Rafsanjani said that the decision had already been made, but did not delineate what it was. It may be assumed that the decision is positive, and that [they are] only waiting for the right timing. In any case, it is clear that the decision was not rejected out of hand and this too has far-reaching significance.

It is difficult to underestimate the significance of the very discussion of this possibility. On the eve of the crisis, Saudi Arabia and Iran headed two conflicting Islamic systems. These differences have been discussed at different times—the pro-Saudi Muslim Brothers against the pro-Iranian Hizballah. The front between them extended not only throughout the entire Middle East, but also went beyond to Afghanistan, Kashmir, and the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

In recent years, pilgrims to Mecca have been aware of this front during religious ceremonies, in that the delegation of the Iranian Hizballah was a perpetual source of trouble and the Khomeyni branch of Iran was constantly demanding to expropriate from Saudi Arabia the responsibility for the security of the pilgrims. The Iraqi propaganda that says that the "American occupation" of the Arabian peninsula has turned the House of Saud from "the guardians of the Holy Places" to "the traitors of the Holy Places" had to fall on attentive ears in Iran—but again, it depends on whose ears they were. The army of Iran is willing to defend Saudi Arabia, but the guardians of the revolutionary embers are ready to hook up with Saddam Husayn against Saudi Arabia.

While al-Asad is hooking up with Rafsanjani's Iran, President Saddam is hooking up with the Khomeyni opposition, and Rafsanjani's willingness to defend Saudi Arabia from Saddam Husayn is, in effect, a challenge to the Hizballah and the beginning of Iran's preparation for a civil war. There is no need to take on the Hizballah on the sands of Saudi Arabia—this can be done in Tehran itself—or in Lebanon.

In order not to sharpen the internal crisis in Iran, Rafsanjani refrained from publishing the joint statement with al-Asad on Tehran Radio, because the power of the Khomeyni revolution is still tremendous. Two weeks ago, the Iranian parliament passed resolutions in the spirit of Khomeyni fundamentalism to Rafsanjani's chagrin, and today worshipers in the mosques of Tehran are supposed to hold huge demonstrations against the American presence in the Gulf. The timing is not coincidental—this is the expression of the Hizballah's bitterness at al-Asad's decisions.

The dangerous situation in Iran stood in the background of an interview held by the all Arab weekly Al-Duwalayah Mouse in June with the leader of the Hizballah in Lebanon, Sheikh Mohammed Fadlallah. He was not asked if Iran was helping to stabilize the situation in Lebanon but if, in his opinion, the dissension in Iran was endangering its stability and turning it into a second Lebanon.

Sheikh Fadlallah expressed absolute opposition to the division of Lebanon, because the intent of this is to turn it partially into an alternate homeland for the Palestinians.

In the joint statement by al-Asad and Rafsanjani there was the first reference of its kind to the "possible

division of Iraq." It appears logical that the two presidents coordinated their positions in the event that war breaks out, and it will expand from the Saudi-Iraqi border to the Syrian border as well. The Syrian army which is already positioned in great force now against the Iraqis, will invade northern Iraq; at the same time, the Iranians will invade the Shiite areas in southern Iraq. Thus, the result of the praise of Arab unity by Saddam Husayn will be Middle East settlements that will determine a new map dividing existing states: Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. In the spirit of the words of Sheikh Fadlallah, a Palestinian canton will be established, and a Palestinian area will also be defined in Jordan. In this manner, Iraq will cease to threaten Syria and Iran.

Until the Kuwaiti crisis, the Saudis viewed Jordan as a buffer between them and the Syrians; and thus were willing to assist it. While lately Jordan has been subjected to Saudi pressures, the nature of which we have explained in the past, in principle, the Saudis did not want to see the fall of the king. But now, when the Syrians are going out to defend them and King Husayn is crowning himself "the sharif of Mecca", and is busy convening a conference of many participants in Amman; all of Saudi Arabia's ill wishers, people like Habash and Hawatimah, who know more than how to talk, believe that from the perspective of Saudi Arabia there is no further need for Jordan. Thus it is preferable to divide the kingdom into its components.

The first sign of Saudi subversion under the foundations of Jordan could be found in the interviews held by the pro-Saudi daily "Al-Sharq Al-Awsat" with Bedouin sheikhs in Jordan, from tribes that, until recently, constituted the backbone of the kingdom, such as the sheikhs of the large tribe al-Magali, which provided prime ministers and army commanders to the Hashemites. Sheikh al-Magali, Feisal, and his son Faras, expressed full support for the Saudi positions and sorrow over the support of Saddam Husayn.

Indeed, the tribal leaders are following worriedly the rapprochement between King Husayn and the Palestinians, and they would prefer to be annexed to Saudi Arabia rather than to be in the company of Habash and Huatma.

The Bedouins in the Ma'an region will go to Saudi Arabia. The northern district will be somehow affiliated with Syria, and the center will become Palestinian. After examining the bitter words of the Saudi ambassador in Washington spoken against Jordan it is clear that this is in reference to a divorce. The Saudis do not care now if the "division of Iraq" is also applied to Jordan.

If so, the ostensibly innocent reference to the "possibility of the division of Iraq" holds within it much more than what appears on the outside.

In one place, al-Asad and Rafsanjani spoke of the need to advance the Palestinian problem, but in the same breath, they mentioned the "irreponsible foundations in the PLO"—and the allusion to 'Arafat was clear. During

mid-week, the Algerian daily "Horizon" reported that Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia had already agreed among themselves upon the establishment of a "new PLO." If established, it will have to approve the plan to find the Palestinians an alternate place in Lebanon and in Jordan. (The Likud need not rejoice too much—there is no doubt that the West Bank and Gaza will remain for the Palestinians—no one will allow the Likud to do a transfer. The formulas being spoken of today are intended to numb the sting of the Palestinian right of return—not to deport them over the river.)

Accordingly, more than at any other time in the past, the problem of Lebanon is becoming tied to the Palestinian problem, and Rafsanjani's support for Lebanon's sovereignty is not consistent with the formulas of the Hizballah, but with the spirit of the Ta'if agreements between Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia for a settlement of the problem of Lebanon. "Full agreement" is a concept which al-Asad certainly applies to Lebanon as well, and not to the Hizballah's benefit. Michel Aoun, Saddam Husayn's ally, should be worried, unless he quickly arrives at a settlement with the Syrians.

The temperature in the Gulf is rising, and new menus are being cooked up in the boiling pots—as long as Saddam does not burn the dish...

EGYPT

Constitutionality of New Assembly Reportedly Challenged

91AA0076A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
26 Oct 90 pp 26-27

[Article by Usamah 'Ajjaj: "Opposition Escorts New Assembly to Its Final Resting Place Before It Is Elected"]

[Text] The first round of the constant struggle between the Egyptian Government and opposition has ended. As usual, the end has been in favor of the government party, considering that the Egyptian judiciary have turned down all the lawsuits filed before them to contest the president's decree summoning voters to participate in a referendum on dissolving the People's Assembly. The decree has been passed by Law No 220 of 1990 which amends the electoral law and which has restored the Egyptian election system to its original form, namely the single electoral district, after failure of the system of election by relative list in the two previous assembly sessions of 1984 and 1987. Opposition party leaders point out that only the first round has ended and that other rounds are on the way, the first of which will take place during the forthcoming People's Assembly election, scheduled for 29 November 1990.

An interview with Kamal Khalid, the attorney who has had the "honor" of dissolving the People's Assembly with the power of the Egyptian judiciary, carries numerous surprises. When told by AL-HAWADITH that contrary to the promise he had made, his chance to

challenge the assembly and to have this assembly dissolved for the third consecutive time has been foiled, Khalid responded: We have a rendezvous in the judiciary arena. What many have not realized is that we have begun the procession to challenge the constitutionality of an assembly that has not been formed yet. Some people are unaware that I and Dr. 'Abd-al-Halim Mandur, a colleague of mine, obtained on the 10th of this month of October from the Administrative Judiciary Court a decision formally accepting the lawsuit and postponing examination of the case until the 19th of next December. We have been given a period of two months to file a new lawsuit before the Supreme Constitutional Court.

Providing AL-HAWADITH with further details on the issue, Attorney Kamal Khalid said: "A number of lawsuits filed by a number of attorneys recently have been confused with each other. I, along with attorneys Dr. 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan and Kamal al-Nasharti, did actually file a lawsuit before the administrative judiciary requesting that the activity pertaining to the referendum to dissolve the People's Assembly be halted. But the court decided that the administrative judiciary has no jurisdiction over the three submitted challenges on the grounds that presidential decrees are part of the sovereignty acts over which the judiciary have no power. But the Ministry of Interior has made the mistake of opening the door of challenging the constitutionality of the forthcoming assembly. Since the days of ex-Minister of Interior Zaki Badr, it has been customary not to issue any executive decrees for presidential decrees summoning voters to participate in referenda because executive decrees issued by the minister of interior are not sovereignty acts. After the non-jurisdiction decision was made, the minister of interior issued decree No 5855 of 1990 on organizing the referendum process and appointing the chairmen and members of the branch committees. The Ministry of Interior officials forgot that a lawsuit filed by Dr. 'Abd-al-Halim Mandur had not been decided yet. Thus, the minister of interior decree came to provide more material for another challenge to article 24 of law by decree No 220 of 1990 which stipulates that the judiciary authorities and counselors shall supervise the general committees only while leaving supervision over the branch committees to government and public sector employees selected as much as possible from the legal departments of the government and public sector agencies. This provision is an open violation of article 88 of the Egyptian constitution which requires that balloting be conducted under the supervision of the judiciary authorities. This is why the Administrative Judiciary Court decided on 10 October to set a two-month period for filing a lawsuit before the Supreme Constitutional Court to challenge the constitutionality of the article and this is why, Attorney Kamal Khalid went on to say, as soon as the door of nomination is opened, I will submit my papers and I will, in this capacity [as candidate], challenge the deviation in dividing the districts and in forming the election committees from people who are not members of the judiciary authorities. I will base my argument on the government attorney's

statement that full judiciary supervision over the election will require holding the election over a 22-day period whereas the elections are ordinarily held in a single day. It is my belief that the Administrative Judiciary Court decision is the first nail in the 'coffin' of the next People's Assembly. This will enable me to fulfill my promise to dissolve the People's Assembly for the third consecutive time."

This is one aspect of the partisan struggle taking place in the Egyptian party arena. But the situation is different within each party, especially since there were, until the moment this report was written, some parties that had not determined their position on participation in the election and on whether to boycott the elections or vote in them. There is a strong and still growing tendency inclined in this direction [of boycott]. However, there are those who stress the need to participate, regardless of the circumstances. Mustafa Kamil Murad, the Liberal Party chairman, has revealed to AL-HAWADITH that a meeting was held at his home in the presence of representatives of al-Wafd, Labor, and Grouping Parties, and of the Muslim Brotherhood to consult on and to discuss the election situation after issuance of the amendments introduced into the law on the exercise of political rights and to make sure of the guarantees for impartial elections, especially the guarantee of judiciary supervision of the activities of the election committees, the guarantee that the voter sign next to his name when he votes, and the guarantee that the state of emergency is suspended, at least from the time the voters are summoned to vote to the time the election results are announced next December. Mustafa Kamil Murad noted that the tendency is to develop a unified position, to establish joint coordination among the opposition parties, and to revive the idea of a front between these parties, especially since a general secretariat was formed for such a front at one time. As for the new parties, they do not constitute a noteworthy force to participate in the elections.

The Grouping Party position reflects an isolated case. Lutfi Wakid, the Grouping's Central Committee secretary general, has told AL-HAWADITH that the preliminary tendency is to wage the elections, especially since the Central Committee has authorized the General Secretariat to make a decision and has advised participation in the elections unless it is absolutely necessary to boycott them. We are trying to make arrangements with the opposition parties in this connection. But these arrangements do not reach the level of alliance because each party has its features and program. The Grouping, the Marxists and the Nasirists may form the only alliance, and it would be a leftist alliance. There is agreement on a special program with which these parties may wage the elections. Lutfi Wakid noted that it is not important to know who is the beneficiary of the single [district] system or of the [relative] list system. But if the list system is beneficial to the opposition in the end, then this system befits a state where political illiteracy and the reading and writing illiteracy have been ended. Besides,

the party platform is not the basis. Rather, the primary consideration is given to the candidate himself. However, a candidate within a list is indebted to whoever has chosen him to be included in the list and to whoever determines his place on the list. Such a candidate is never indebted to the masses that select him. Lutfi Wakid has also revealed to AL-HAWADITH that the Grouping will not wage the elections in all districts but in some districts where it believes it has a reasonable chance to win. He has denied that the Gulf crisis and the Grouping Party position will influence the party's chances of success in the elections, saying: "We believe that our position has been the only sound position. We have not supported Iraq's invasion of Kuwait but we support the warning against the foreign forces' positions and presence."

Yasin Siraj-al-Din, chairman of al-Wafd Party Parliamentary Group, has revealed that nearly 70 percent of the Parliamentary Group members support participation in the elections but that the final decision belongs to the Higher Committee. The Higher Committee did actually convene but the assassination of Dr. Rif'at al-Mahjub imposed itself on the meeting and no decision was made. Yasin Siraj-al-Din said that there are two tendencies in al-Wafd Party:

The first supports participation in the elections, considering that the fundamental function of political parties is election and that a party's struggle materializes through contact with the masses and not by sitting in air-conditioned offices or by writing articles. Parties are not cultural associations. If a party fails once, then such failure is in the nature of the political life. With time and with repeated election experiences, the opportunity to attain power and to implement a party's programs becomes available. Otherwise, a party loses its meaning and withers gradually, turning into a mere slogan. However, the opposition parties waged the 1984 election and we then waged the 1987 election even though we were aware that they would not be free of rigging. A third reason that motivates the party to wage the elections is to utilize the popular base which al-Wafd Party has created with its rejection of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

As to those who oppose participation, their justifications, says Yasin Siraj-al-Din, are that the regime has not provided the guarantees demanded by the opposition, that the possibilities of rigged elections are extant and great, and that the modifications in the division of election districts do not promise a clean election campaign. Those supporting participation have responded that the presence of any number of Wafd deputies in the parliament is an important national deed, even if these deputies can be counted on the fingers of one hand. A party without deputies is like an army without air cover. Yasin Siraj-al-Din denied that there is a plan to coordinate with the opposition parties, pointing out an important reason for the absence of such a plan. This reason, according to what he told AL-HAWADITH, is the disagreement with the other parties' position on the Gulf

crisis. It is unreasonable for us to coordinate with those who have taken a stance opposing al-Wafd's tendencies on this vital issue.

'Abd-al-Hamid Barakat, the Labor Party secretary general, revealed that there are ongoing debates within the party and that they have not reached a definite conclusion. He told AL-HAWADITH that there are sound reasons for the party's and opposition's refusal to wage the elections, including the fact that the opposition demanded judiciary supervision of the elections and that this demand has not been met. The opposition has also demanded abolition of the state of emergency law but the government has not heeded the demand. There has also been a demand that a voter sign next to his name in the voter lists when he votes. But nothing has been heard about this demand either. Moreover, rigging elections is easier under the single [district] election system than under the list election system. Another opinion sees that it is necessary to participate so that the political parties and the Labor Party may not be absent from the masses' issues. This opinion is answered by the masses themselves who have told us: You had 100 members in the previous People's Assembly, so what did you do? We are not a majority in order that we may be the decision makers. 'Abd-al-Halim Barakat denied that consideration is being given to ending the alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, telling AL-HAWADITH: Coordination exists and the alliance continues. Currently, it is easy to divide the districts according to the presence of each of the two tendencies, i.e. labor and the brotherhood. Moreover, our program will not change. It is the same program of 1987, especially since we have not been able to accomplish much of this program due to numerous circumstances.

If the dialogue within the opposition parties is on participating or refusing to participate in the People's Assembly elections, then the situation in the National Democratic Party is different. A committee has been formed to consider the candidacy applications and to determine who will run in the various districts—their number has been increased from 176 to 222 districts—in an attempt to settle the struggle, conflicts, and competition between the party elements. The final list will be presented to President Husni Mubarak so that he may examine it with a number of advisers before he gives it his approval. An informed party source has assured AL-HAWADITH that with the onset of each election, the opposition parties always try to pressure the regime under the pretext of election counterfeiting in an effort to make some gains and to create a public opinion that supports them. But they always take part in the elections. The only precedent to the boycott with which they are threatening now is the boycott of the latest Consultative Assembly elections from which al-Wafd and the Grouping were absent. It was the opinion of these two parties that this assembly is not important in Egypt's party life.

'Final Draft' of Confidential Accounts Law Published

91AA023A Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 30 Sep 90 p 7

[Article by Faraj Abu-al-'Izz]

[Text] AL-AKHBAR has obtained the final draft of the law on bank-accounts confidentiality which the cabinet discussed at its meeting yesterday under Prime Minister Dr. 'Atif Sidqi. The draft provides for confidentiality of all accounts, deposits, and transactions relating to them, and for banks to open numbered accounts for their clients with funds received from abroad, or to fix deposits from such funds. The identity of owners of such accounts shall be known only to bank officials who shall be determined by a decision by the bank managing board.

The managing board of the Egyptian Central Bank shall determine the banks that are allowed to open such accounts. The Attorney General, or whomever he may delegate in the rank of at least first public advocate, may, at his own initiative or at the request of an administrative body or of those concerned, request from Cairo Appellate Court permission to obtain a statement of the numbered accounts or deposits. The court shall decide on the request within 48 hours from receiving the request after hearing the argument of the Public Prosecutor.

The following is text of the draft:

Article 1—All bank accounts and deposits and transactions relating to them shall remain confidential and may not be disclosed or data about them be given directly or indirectly, except by written permission of the owner of the account, the depositor, the inheritors or by those to whom all these funds or part thereof have been bequeathed or in accordance with a court decision. This restriction applies to all individuals and parties authorized by law, whether by a general or a specific clause, to see or obtain confidential papers and data.

Article 2—Banks may open for their clients free numbered accounts with funds received from abroad or fix deposits from such funds whose owners shall be known only to bank officials who shall be determined by a decision by the bank managing board. The Egyptian Central Bank managing board shall determine the banks permitted to open such accounts. The minister of economy, in agreement with the governor of the Central Bank, shall determine the terms and conditions that should be met to open such accounts. Under no circumstances may the identity of the owner of the account or of the numbered deposit be revealed except by written permission from him, his inheritors or those to whom these funds or part thereof have been bequeathed, or by a legal attorney or the agent of any of these, or on the basis of a court ruling or a ruling by arbitrators.

Article 3—Excluding the above two articles, the Attorney General, or whomever he may delegate in the rank of at least first public advocate, may, at his own initiative or at the request of an administrative body or of those who may be concerned, request Cairo Appellate

Court for permission to obtain a statement of accounts or deposits referred to in order to determine liability under a lien deposited with a bank, if such lien is not based on a mandatory ruling, or if it should be necessary to reveal the truth regarding a misdemeanor or a felony the occurrence of which new evidence has established. The court shall decide on the request within 48 hours from its submission after hearing the argument of the public prosecution.

Article 4—The Central Bank managing board shall lay down the rules governing the exchange of information and data with the banks and among the banks themselves concerning their clients' civil accounts, with a view to ensuring their confidentiality and the availability of data necessary for the security of granting bank credits.

Article 5—Chairmen and members of boards of management of banks and those employed by them are prohibited from giving or divulging information or data about individuals or enable others to gain knowledge of such information, other than in cases where it is permitted in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Article 6—Rules of this law are without prejudice to the powers vested in the Central Bank or in the Ministry of Economy provided in Law No. 163 of 1957 to issue bank and credit laws; Law No. 120 of 1975 concerning the Central Bank and the banking system; and Law No. 97 of 1976 organizing transactions with foreign currency. Those employed by the two bodies in question shall maintain confidentiality in the manner stipulated in article five of this law and banks shall be obliged to give the payee of a check drawn on the account of any of their clients a certificate stating the reasons for refusing to cash a check if such a certificate is requested.

Article 7—Every person violating provisions of article five and six of this law shall be punished by a minimum of two years of imprisonment and a fine not exceeding 10,000 pounds.

Article 8—This law shall be published in the official gazette and shall come into effect the day following its publication.

ISRAEL

Sharon Discusses Immigration, Likud Infighting

91AE0040A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 28 Sep 90 p 7

[Interview with 'Ari'el Sharon Minister of Immigration Absorption by correspondent Yeshayahu ben Porat; date, place not given]

[Text] Even before I could get a word out, 'Ari'el Sharon, wearing sandals, khaki pants, and a blue shirt, got the jump on me, inviting me to come along for a lightning visit to a construction site in the town next to his home, Shderot.

At the site, which served until recently as a garbage dump at the edge of town, a dozen bulldozers and heavy

tractors were working to grade and resurface the land, which stretches over about 300 dunams. The workers maneuvered giant cranes for laying sewage pipes in the gaping trenches.

"Here," Sharon said, with the satisfaction of a homeowner, "666 one-story homes will be built, a solution to the housing problems of about 2,000 to 2,500 people. The first houses will be completed by the end of December. In 'Ofaqim and Ntivot the construction situation is even more advanced. The Negev scenery is changing.

Only in those places, within the framework of 3,000 houses that were authorized to me by the government under emergency regulations, do I not need the signature of Treasury clerks for every step I make. Therefore, only here is it progressing at the proper rate. Beyond that, 15,000 such homes will be ready throughout the country, in the north and the south, by 30 April 1991. Housing solutions for about 55,000 people [as published]. There are towns, like Karmi'el and 'Eilat, where the number of inhabitants will actually double in less than a year.

Afterwards, in a burst of sudden emotion and in a caustic tone, he protested: "Problems arise wherever different government ministries are involved. Karmi'el is growing. It will double or triple its population within a few years. A thousand apartments are currently being built there. But its sewage system does not meet the requirements of the existing population. Sewage is an interministerial problem: involving the ministries of Interior, Construction, Environmental Quality and, of course, Treasury. All of them are involved with the problem, but the problem has not gone away.

In 'Eilat 6,000 apartments will be built, 2,500 of which are already under construction. But there is a serious lack of drinking water. That problem involves the ministries of Agriculture, Energy, Construction, and Treasury. That means endless discussions. And so on. There is no end to it."

[Yeshayahu ben Porat] My dear sir, even your harshest opponents were happy to see you appointed as Minister of Immigration Absorption. Three months have gone by since then, and that enthusiasm has given way to disappointment. Everything seems to be on hold. What happened?

[Sharon] Absorbing this enormous flow of immigrants from the USSR is a struggle, like fighting a war. As in warfare, the rules of battle have to be different from normal times. Whoever is put in charge of the front has to have decisionmaking authority. In war time you can't have endless discussions over every detail with the clerical echelon, which doesn't have overall responsibility. I want the responsibility to be mine, in accordance with government decisions.

[Porat] Is everything on hold because of the existing system?

[Sharon] The existing system is like running the gauntlet. It's a distorted system that doesn't let people work. The worst bureaucracy of all is not the one that stands between the citizen and government ministries but rather the interministerial bureaucracy. Take, for example, mortgages for immigrants: There are apartments, there is the money that the government has set aside for immigrants, but there is a total lack of connection between those things because the immigrants are required, while they are still learning Hebrew in the Ulpans, not only to bring three guarantors, but also to prove that they have a monthly salary—when they still don't have a job!

[Porat] Is someone sabotaging the whole thing?

[Sharon] First, you had to make up for a delay of a year and a half in public construction. But accelerated construction has yet to begin on a large scale because of the government's unwillingness to guarantee the contractors the purchase of any apartment they can't sell. This, even when the contractors sell apartments to the government at almost no profit. In my opinion that is evasion of responsibility. I regret that the government is unprepared to accept for itself the risk inherent in that.

[Porat] Does the government have the necessary resources to accept a 100 percent obligation?

[Sharon] Of course it does. It is in the federal budget.

[Porat] Then why the objection?

[Sharon] It is just evasion of responsibility. I have no other explanation.

[Porat] But after all, you are the responsible Minister.

[Sharon] I brought this up to the government two months ago; I explained that in the central part of the country, between Netanya and 'Ashdod, there is no need for a guarantee. In the center, the contractors must build on their own responsibility. But, in the north and the south, in the Galilee and the Negev, the government must provide a 100 percent guarantee.

[Porat] What did the government say?

[Sharon] It didn't accept my position. It left a 50 percent guarantee in the center, which is entirely superfluous. In the rest of the areas it increased the guarantee to a maximum of 80 percent. But that imposes too high a risk on the contractors. If a contractor builds 1,000 apartments and is left with 100 unsold, he will go bankrupt.

[Porat] So you threw up your hands?

[Sharon] I didn't throw up my hands. In the end, after a lot of suffering for the immigrants, for young couples and for those without apartments, after the waste of weeks and months, after they had just about driven everybody crazy, believe me, in the end it will happen.

[Porat] That's one reason why things are stuck on center; what else?

[Sharon] Reason number two: not upgrading apartment mortgages. Since June 1989 the housing index has risen 40 percent, but mortgages were only upgraded by 20 percent. Under those circumstances the immigrants and the needy can't purchase apartments. That is another example of stupid bureaucracy.

[Porat] I am going back to a previous question: Is someone sabotaging the issue?

[Sharon] I regret to have to say 'Yes' although I would put the word 'sabotage' in quotation marks.

[Porat] Can you be more specific?

[Sharon] There is sabotage in the work of the Construction Ministry. Here is an example that I already gave this week: The most burning question now is finding a solution to the housing shortage. The immediate solution is trailer homes. Two months ago the government authorized the purchase of 5,000 trailer homes. Of those, after a thorough study conducted with the mayors, about 2,000 trailer homes will be allotted for people without apartments in the large cities, in advance of the rainy season.

On the basis of a strict bid, it was decided to purchase the trailer homes in England. They could already have been loaded on board ship three months ago. The British supplier was prepared to deliver them on the basis of a verbal commitment by my deputy director, with the money to be paid afterward. Would you believe that someone from Treasury contacted the supplier and warned him that if he did that and accepted just a verbal commitment, he wouldn't get a single agora. That isn't sabotage?

[Porat] When you were in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and in the Ministry of Defense, you wouldn't put up with that kind of situation. You knew how to pound the table. Why are you putting up with it now?

[Sharon] I am not putting up with it. I fight it every day. I am fighting against a malicious bureaucracy and I won't let up. I haven't tired and I haven't changed. But meanwhile I am doing it patiently and quietly. I have to believe that the one man in government who is fully behind me is the Prime Minister. You know the kind of relationships we had in the not-too-distant past. But on this issue Shamir is behind me all the way.

[Porat] It turns out that Treasury is the prime saboteur?

[Sharon] Treasury is constantly interfering, for example on the smallest paragraph in the bids. Treasury is an endless thorn in my side and doesn't let me get the job done. The government decided on a new method of bidding beginning

on 1 September. The ministries prepared the new method. But Treasury has yet to give its approval, and there is therefore no way to implement bidding because the old system is void. Because of Treasury's opposition, the new one cannot be implemented.

[Porat] The system is paralyzed?

[Sharon] Absolutely paralyzed, there is no other word for it.

[Porat] Will you draw the necessary conclusions?

[Sharon] I talked with the Prime Minister this week. He is backing me and I will solve the problems.

[Porat] Meanwhile, despite all that, how are hundreds of immigrants being absorbed every day?

[Sharon] Despite all the difficulties, things are getting done. The construction of 15,000 apartments is moving full speed ahead. About 21,000 apartments are being built privately. In the end, the trailer homes will also get here. The contractors are only waiting for the government guarantee. All that has to take time, houses cannot spring up overnight like mushrooms after the rain. As you know, we have also fixed up the 'Amidar apartments: Thus far, out of 8,800 apartments, we have completed improvements on 4,558 with another 2,000 being fixed up right now.

[Porat] Are the difficulties also the result of someone wanting to stop the large immigration?

[Sharon] The Israeli public still feels that the immigration will be absorbed, but that the process will take place without their being deeply involved. That is also true of some of the government ministries and local authorities. It is a terrible mistake. It will not happen as we simply continue with our normal lives. We still don't have a sense of emergency about it.

[Porat] Aren't we headed for a catastrophe, including immigrants living in tents in the rain, as per the forecast of Absorption Minister Rabbi Peretz?

[Sharon] That was a mistake on his part. He explained to me that he thought it would lower tensions among those living in tents in Israel. The next day, in Moscow, I was already asked by Jews if they would be living in tents.

We must not forget that the Jews leaving the USSR did not live there destitute. Most of them actually belong to the privileged class, with nice apartments full of books, everything imbued with culture. There they don't eat the things we have here, but these are not hungry people—even though they are in flight and want to leave, no matter what.

[Porat] "No matter what," might mean bringing them to other countries?

[Sharon] Of course. I already saw a line of Jews there at the East German embassy.

[Porat] Can we speed up their exodus to us?

[Sharon] We can, I have been working on that and will continue to do so. I tried, for the time being in vain, to put up a roof in the courtyard of the embassy in Moscow where a thousand or more people stand every day, exposed to the rain and snow, in heat and in cold.

A year—listen well—a year! That's how long the inter-ministerial struggle in Israel has been going on for putting up a roof for those Jews. And there is still no structure. They discuss endlessly and pointlessly what structure, how much it will cost, who will pay for it, how to transfer the money and at what rate. For two weeks since I came back, I have been dealing with that structure, trying to coordinate things, but still nothing has been done.

Meanwhile they stand there in the cold. Winter has already begun in Moscow. But our government is unable to allocate the quarter million needed to put up the roof structure. Our representative there, 'Arye Levin, has also been screaming his lungs out, to no effect. There is still no roof.

[Porat] Why didn't a minister of your status wait for an official invitation from the Kremlin?

[Sharon] I was officially invited by the deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Republic. I only left when the invitation had his signature and the visa was in hand. I didn't travel on my own initiative. I consulted with the Prime Minister, and he supported me.

It was important to me to meet with the Jews, and I intend to go again in another two months on one matter: How to accelerate the exodus, not only from Moscow, but also from other cities. The Russians had other interests, and I held discussions, among others, with the Minister of Economy of the Russian Republic.

[Porat] Will any business result from that?

[Sharon] Yes, but in the proper proportions. Headlines of the type "Israel Will Help the USSR to Solve its Economic Problems" are, of course, not serious. It is very hard to undertake economic activities in the USSR. It is not good to live with delusions. There is a lot of enthusiasm and good will there, but also a fundamental lack of understanding of Western economics.

Mayor of Umm-al-Fahm on Islamic Movement

91AE0055B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in
Hebrew 19 Oct 90 pp 21, 23, 26

[Article by Arie Dayan]

[Text] Just over two months ago, when the first American soldiers landed in Saudi Arabia, Ra'ad Salah Muhajinah, the mayor of Umm-al-Fahm, decided to change his style of dress. Thirty-two years old, he had always dressed, more or

less, the way most of his contemporaries in Umm-al-Fahm did. His shirts, his friends, say, were perhaps slightly worn and his pants usually very conservative. But his clothing, all in all, followed the style of western dress favored in Umm-al-Fahm, other Arab settlements in Israel and the territories.

Since the beginning of August, he has worn long, white gelebayas [robes] and a very large, embroidered white skull cap. His new clothes have erased every trace of the west from him. Even before that, he had sported a short, well-groomed beard popular with men who, like he, regard themselves as in the Islamic stream, which has flourished even in Israel in recent years. He adopted the traditional dress, he explained this week, as a form of protest. When the armies of the United States and its allies, prominent representatives of the west, camped near holy Mecca, he felt the need to display for all to see his bond with Islam and tradition.

He has decided to continue wearing traditional garb even after the Americans leave Saudi Arabia. Although he donned it at first as a sign of protest, he quickly realized that the dress of his forefathers made more sense than that of his generation. "It is much more comfortable than a shirt and pants," he said in an interview this week, while grasping a "James Bond" briefcase.

Long before he adopted Islamic tradition in dress, he had introduced it into another sphere of his life. In rural Islamic society, it is customary to call someone by his first name along with his father's given name. This tradition attaches little importance to the family name. For that reason, the mayor of Umm-al-Fahm would like to be called Ra'ad Salah. He says that he also may be addressed as Shaykh Ra'ad or Haj Ra'ad. He performed the commandment of the hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca, after being elected mayor last year.

Shortly before the election, he sought to remove the name Muhajinah from the ballot. His opponents, however, succeeded in their petition to the Haifa district court to require that the election commission include the name on the ballots. Muhajinah is the name of one of the four great clans in the city, and his opponents apparently hoped that his appearance under that name would reduce him to a clan candidate. Their hopes were disappointed: Muhajinah received votes from all the clans.

His clothing habits could be considered a curiosity of no importance if not for the fact that Muhajinah is a highly esteemed personage, and not only within the Islamic movement in which he stands as a leader. As a respected man, he serves also as a role model; it is therefore reasonable to suppose that, in the not too distant future, more and more young Muslims in Israel will forsake their jeans for the gelebaya. Long before he dreamed of becoming mayor of the town, he held hundreds of the city's youth spellbound with the sermons he gave at one of its mosques. He was one of the first young men in the

city to grow a beard. Anyone strolling through Umm-al-Fahm today must form the impression, without the need for conclusive statistics, that the number of men with beards is much higher among the young than among their fathers. Muhajinah has flourished as a local leader but has also become, in a relatively short time, a leader of national stature in this movement which, surely and swiftly, is acquiring the standing of a moving force among the Arabs of Israel.

Last Wednesday, two days after the bloody events outside the al-Aqsa mosque, he traveled to Jerusalem to gather evidence of what happened. This week, while sitting below a picture of the president of the country hanging in his small, dilapidated office in city hall, he offers his version of the incident. The picture he draws is monstrous. He describes a brutal massacre, premeditated and deliberate, of peaceful worshipers. All the Muslims in his portrayal refrained from violence even after they were attacked. No policeman on the Temple Mount was threatened with harm, because no Muslim assaulted any officer. All the Israelis, as he describes it, engaged in inhumane cruelty. They fired indiscriminately, abused corpses, prevented aid to the wounded, and watched in glee from the side. The stones landing in the Western Wall plaza, he says, were thrown by Israelis to justify the killings already perpetrated.

As he spoke, he was well aware that his words did not sound particularly believable to a Jewish ear. He repeated this sentence again and again: "I found it difficult to believe what happened, too." Over and over, he emphasized the fact that he had heard these things more than once from more than one eyewitness in different places. It was clear that he knew his comments sounded totally imaginary, a grisly blood libel.

Nonetheless, it was equally clear that he was utterly convinced of the truth of his account. People entering the office as he spoke—city officials and council members—listened transfixed, although they obviously had heard the story before. The reactions on each of their faces showed that they too believed his story with all their hearts. "The evidence I heard keeps coming back to me," he says. "A picture keeps running through my mind like a movie." Since returning from Jerusalem, he has told his account to dozens of people. A considerable percentage of the people of Umm-al-Fahm, it seems, believe in it. It has even become the official Arab version of the carnage. Therein lies its importance.

He says he spoke with the wounded at al-Moqased hospital, relatives of the dead, youths arrested and then released, and people who managed to flee the scene safely. From these conversations, he came to the conclusion that everything began when hundreds of Muslims, children and adults of all ages and both sexes, were at prayer outside the mosque. The service, he says, was conducted in a quiet and perfectly peaceful manner. Suddenly, for no reason and without any provocation, before even a single stone flew through the air, tear gas grenades were lobbed from the corners of the plaza.

Stricken people began to scream and run, creating confusion among the worshipers. Hundreds of people in the plaza scrambled in search of shelter from the gas.

At that point, the mayor of Umm-al-Fahm says, the real outrage began. Policemen lined up along the plaza wall and opened fire on the fleeing Muslims. He says that the descriptions he heard reminded him of movies of the wild west; until then, he had found it difficult to believe that such things really happened. He still finds it difficult, but now he believes, for the fact is that 22 people died and hundreds were wounded. When the police opened fire, he continues, the Muslims' sole reaction was to cry out, "Allah is great." That was when the second stage began, an atrocity worse than before. Policemen started shooting even from rooftops overlooking the Mount.

One of the people present there told Muhajinah what he saw while hiding beneath the water facilities in the center of the plaza. A group of Muslims was trapped between two teams of policemen. The Muslims, including a small child, were in a panic. The police, so the man told Muhajinah, were having fun. Muhajinah believed the man's report that the police held a contest to see which of them would be the first to hit the child. A number of police fired at the child, killing him. The witness also told Muhajinah that at least one policeman later stomped on the dead child's head. He says that he heard this story from more than one person and believed it was true. He is not the only Palestinian, in Israel and territories, who believes that.

He also believes all the other evidence he collected: Police prevented evacuation of the wounded for hospital treatment, ambulances en route were deliberately blocked, police stopped paramedics, who managed despite the obstacles to arrive at the Mount, from giving aid to the victims. And he believes, of course, in the version he heard regarding the stones thrown down on the Western Wall. One person arrested told him that after everything was over, all the detainees were placed on the ground and instructed to lie face down. Not one Muslim was moving on the plaza. The detainee then heard the sound of stones clattering. These, Muhajinah is convinced, were the stones thrown at the Wall. Muhajinah has no doubts. Someone in Israel, he just does not know who, planned the slaughter.

His father and two brothers serve in the Israeli police. He himself finished high school in Umm-al-Fahm, after which his father, himself a devout Muslim, sent him for further study at the Islamic University in Hebron. On his return just over ten years ago, he became a preacher in one of the city's mosques. He quickly became the center of a group of youths his own age, some of them "returning" to religion, who founded the first Islamic association in Umm-al-Fahm. At about the same time, Shaykh Abdallah Nimr Darwish founded a similar group in his own village of Kfar Qasim.

These two organizations employed nearly identical methods. They built their strength from below, carefully and diligently. In 1985, they opened five daytime clubs and kindergartens in Umm-al-Fahm. Until then, Umm-al-Fahm had no educational program for young children. Over the years, they established an infirmary that provided free medical care to all in need. Umm-al-Fahm has three clinics run by Qupat Holim [Labor affiliated health service], but they close in the afternoon. The Islamic clinic is open until midnight. Each year, they have run a volunteer work camp. One time, they built a library, another time they renovated a mosque; once, they built shelters and installed facilities at the local cemetery; another time, they erected lighting at the local basketball court. Contractors sympathetic to the movement have contributed the equipment and tools. Even before their victory at the polls, the associations functioned in practice as an alternative municipality.

In less than ten years, all the local Islamic organizations merged into a nationwide movement. In the municipal elections of 1989, the movement won the leadership of five local councils. Muhajinah is one of the heads of the movement, not just at the local level but across the country. Some say that only Shaykh Darwish, chairman of the movement, is more important. Another version, common among Arab political personalities not associated with the Islamic movement, has it that Darwish's position of superiority is only a matter of appearance. Muhajinah, they argue, represents the movement's supporters better than Darwish does.

Darwish, who founded the movement and set its course through the first years, deserves mostly historical credit. Darwish did mark the path, but Muhajinah has gone beyond it. A year and a half ago, he won 75 percent of the votes cast by the city's 25,000 residents. The Islamic list he headed captured 11 of the 15 seats on the city council. Last year, the Islamic movement called on its followers to boycott the Histadrut elections. The turnout in Umm-al-Fahm barely reached 40 percent. Achievements such as these have made Muhajinah the movement's senior representative on the watchdog [as published] committee, the most important political body in the Israeli Arab political world.

Darwish's manner of expression is much more moderate and diplomatic than Muhajinah's. Unlike Muhajinah, Darwish seeks a Jewish audience. Such appearances make Muhajinah uncomfortable, and not just because he speaks Hebrew far less easily than Darwish. Muhajinah apparently knows that he has nothing to sell to the Jewish public. He cannot say things that the Jews, even the most dovish, enjoy hearing. What he can say, a Jewish audience surely would find most unpleasant to hear. It is not surprising that he evaded answers to almost every political question put to him this week.

Darwish publicly declares his support for peace based on the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Muhajinah, by contrast, refuses to detail his view of the subject. "The Palestinian side," he says, "is

forever proposing solutions and the Israeli side is forever rejecting them." He is therefore not prepared to continue offering solutions. In one of the issues of the movement's publication, before it was suspended for three months on orders of the Ministry of the Interior, the following remarks appeared: "Palestine is holy to Islam. It is the property not of the Palestinians or even the Arabs, but of all Muslims for all time, past and current. No one, no matter what, has the right to yield or 'lease' a single inch of its land." Muhajinah refuses to say whether this, the viewpoint of the Islamic movement, is also his own. He also refuses to state who, in his opinion, is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO or HAMAS [Islamic Resistance Movement]. The Palestinian people must choose its representative and it has not yet made that choice, he says.

Darwish knows how sensitive most Jews in Israel are and tries to adjust his statements to them accordingly. In almost every appearance he makes before Jews, he speaks of the Holocaust and his revulsion at the theories of the Nazis. Muhajinah makes no such efforts. It seems that he has no interest at all in joint action with Jewish organizations. In a rare appearance before a Jewish audience during a study day at Giv'at Haviva [MAPAM (United Workers Party) sponsored institute for Jewish-Arab cooperation], he tried to define himself. "I define myself as a Muslim in my outlook on life, the world and the need for the existence of a government and faith that realize the humanity of man....At the same time, I am an Arab. And I have a third allegiance, to the Palestinians. I have yet a fourth dimension—I am a man seeking to realize human goals." He did not make any mention of his status as an Israeli. He said this week that he is an Israeli citizen and, as such, obeys the laws of the state and wishes to enjoy the privileges of citizenship.

Darwish contends that Israel within the Green Line, and not greater Palestine, is the arena of his movement's activity. Thus, he stands for integration into the Israeli political-parliamentary system. Muhajinah is faithful to the views of the Islamic movement which, at this time, hold that activity must focus on the municipal level only, that is, activity that will not deviate from the Arab-Islamic mold. He refused this week to state his position on the movement's participation in the next Knesset elections. He would say only that the movement's authorities were discussing that issue. Whatever position emerges from that discussion will be his as well. In the past, he has been quoted at least once as saying that "the Knesset represents a form of legislation that contradicts that which Allah ordered and handed down to us."

He manages the affairs of Umm-al-Fahm more or less as Allah commands him. When the town council decided to impose a heavy increase in city taxes, it issued a notice opening with the words, "In the name of merciful and compassionate Allah, God be praised, prayer and peace to Mohammed the messenger of God and to those of his people whom he has chosen. The situation in Umm-al-Fahm is hardly a secret these days. The new town administration grasped the reins when the crisis reached its peak. All

Muslims are brothers, one will not wrong another or abandon him to the pounding waves but rather will be a support to him. Therefore, the city council has decided to raise municipal taxes 35 percent over last year's rate." Muhajaneh's political opponents castigate him on the ground that, contrary to the promises he made during the election campaign, he has not canceled the interest debts forbidden by the laws of Allah.

Still, he has brought about an almost absolute separation between boys and girls in the city high school. On the eve of the new school year, the city held a public referendum for parents of all high school students. The referendum was preceded by the broadest possible array of pressures, social and otherwise. Followers of the Islamic movement presented the two choices in this manner: "studies according to Islamic tradition" or "studies according to the ways of outsiders." The result: Two thirds voted for sex segregated classes. Only through the intervention of the Ministry of Education was the city compelled to allow those students wishing to continue in mixed classes to do so.

The cafes of Umm-al-Fahm do not sell alcoholic drinks. That was so even before the victory of the Islamic list in the elections. But until then, city residents were able to drink beer at a restaurant near the gas station at the entrance to town. The station, located along the main road, also served many Jewish diners. That was the justification by which the authorities in the past had permitted it to violate the food and drink laws of Islam. A year ago, the city decided that the law would be applied to the famous restaurant as well. The result is that most of the clientele, Jewish and Muslim alike, now prefers to dine at the restaurant outside Kfar Qer'a, ten kilometers from Umm-al-Fahm. There, beer is still provided as in the past. The restaurant by the gas station in Umm-al-Fahm has since closed.

Relations between the Israeli establishment and the city fathers of the Islamic movement, including Muhajinah, are ambivalent. Inside the Ministry of the Interior and the other ministries and bureaus assigned to Arab affairs, they are assessing the way in which purely municipal affairs of the city are conducted but have already expressed concern over the political tendencies the city is showing. Minister of the Interior Arie'el Der'i has made an official visit to Umm-al-Fahm as Muhajaneh's guest, offered aid to cover the city's debts and, at the same time, issued an order shutting the movement's journal.

Der'i went to Umm-al-Fahm to apologize for a well-publicized remark he made the night of the city elections. At that time, immediately after learning of the Islamic movement's crushing victory in Umm-al-Fahm, Der'i said, "We'll look back fondly on RAKAH [New Communist List]." His visit to the city turned a new page between him and the Islamic movement. Muhajinah said this week that his working relationship with the Minister is excellent and even friendly but that, "lately, to my regret, he [Der'i] is occupied with his own problem [an investigation into alleged improprieties] and hasn't the

time to deal with the local Arab authorities." Muhajinah, incidentally, is convinced that the root of the police investigation of Der'i is planted in the Interior Minister's role in the collapse of the national unity government. "He was the first politician identified with the eastern sector, which brought down the Likud government and nearly formed a Labor-led government," Muhajinah explains. He believes that everything now happening to Der'i is occurring because the Likud wants to warn him against similar acts in the future.

Unlike local councils led by HADASH, [Democratic Front for Peace and Equality] Muhajinah does not complain about discrimination by the state. When asked about that, he says that discrimination exists but he is trying both to fight it and improve the city's condition within the existing discriminatory system. "Why demand budgets comparable to those of Afula," he asks, "if I know I won't receive them?" That is the main difference between councils led by the Islamics and those by their Communist counterparts.

Town councils led by RAKAH have generally steered clear of solving the problems of their municipalities and making demands on their residents. Discrimination has given them an easy excuse for not raising or even carefully collecting taxes. RAKAH, which has always defined itself as an Israeli party in nature and Jewish-Arab in makeup, has complained against discrimination if only to prove its Arab patriotism. The Islamic movement does not need to prove that to anyone. It does not pretend to be an Israeli party and so can allow itself to impose financial burdens on the taxpayers. The Israeli establishment, which for many years has fought a war without quarter against RAKAH and council leaders under its banner, will now be compelled to struggle against such phenomena as Muhajinah's theory of the events that occurred on the Temple Mount. In the end, it may turn out that Der'i was not far wrong in the remarks he made the night of the elections. In the near future, many Israelis may yearn for the days of RAKAH.

Reasons for Upsurge in Violence Given

91AE0055A TelAvivMA'ARIVinHebrew24 Oct 90 p 5

[Interview with Ruven Hazak, former deputy chief of the General Security Service by Josef Walter; date, place not given]

[Text] "There is no operational solution to the recent wave of violence. Nor are there operational tools that will totally eliminate the problem," says Ruven Hazak, formerly deputy chief of the General Security Service.

According to Hazak, the immediate remedies for the situation are a brief closure of the territories; selective entry of residents from Judaea, Samaria and Gaza into Israel; prohibiting Arabs from staying overnight in Israel; augmenting the civil guard; and increasing patrols and surprise inspections.

"Unless linked to political measures, no attempt to gain control over the situation will stop the bloody spiral. What can be done right now is only tactical, not strategic," says Hazak.

[Walter] What do you mean by political measures?

[Hazak] The bottom line is separation of the sides by sealing the Green Line. They can live there, and we can live here.

[Walter] After a long period of quiet in the intifadah, a wave of terror has struck. Do its roots lie solely in the events on the Temple Mount?

[Hazak] I would not use the word terror to describe the recent wave of violence. It is a popular uprising, part of the intifadah. Those who argued that the intifadah was waning were greatly mistaken. It has been an uninterrupted social phenomenon, and like all such phenomena, has had ups and downs. For a while, we were in a valley.

Now there is another peak. In this instance, the fuse that set it off was the Temple Mount incident. I have no doubt that calm will return, only to be followed by another hot period.

[Walter] Do you subscribe to the view that the intifadah has broadened its scope so that it is no longer a matter of children throwing stones and people working for the terrorist organizations?

[Hazak] Without a doubt, the intifadah has taken on a grave, new dimension. We are now witnessing isolated individuals who translate their impulses into violence. That is not terror in the classical sense. It is something deeper, a sort of spiritual process through which the intifadah has passed. We are also witnesses to a trend of suicidal acts. We see not the rank-and-file terrorist acting on orders but a man who, seeking revenge, grabs a knife and sets out to commit murder.

The young Arab who committed the murders in Jerusalem went out to his death. He could not know that the police cadet would decide to shoot him only in the legs.

Government's Lack of New Settlements Criticized

91AE0083B Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
1 Oct 90 p 17

[Commentary by Haggai Segel]

[Text] If, and I emphasize if, David Levi indeed did not surrender to the ugly American attempt to make the transfer of a paltry \$400 million to our account contingent on a freeze in settlement activity in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, it would be necessary to say a *shehekiyanu* [benediction, sometimes recited after deliverance from an ordeal]. Since 1948, not a single Israeli government official has refused to accept a check from the U.S. Government because of principle. Our entire foreign policy, from Moshe Sharet to Moshe

Arens, has been based on the principle that it is forbidden to forget that the Jews live by the grace of the Americans, and to obey [them] accordingly. Each time an Israeli prime minister toys with the idea of saying a small "no" to the White House, he remembers the large check that must arrive from Washington, and he cables our ambassador there to say "yes." Even the patriot Begin, who once threatened in Kiryat Arba' to tell the United States "a single, small word—no," bowed at their feet; the bitter outcome is known.

Bravo Levi. True, \$400 million is not a significant sum, and the overall issue concerns loan guarantees (the Americans have now given Egypt \$5.5 billion in the form of debt forgiveness). However, for a start, it is good enough. Perhaps Baker will now have learned that no nation can dictate to us where and when to settle; receive advance notice from us regarding every settlement; or examine our books to check on which side of the green line each American dollar is invested.

Only one problem spoils the happiness: if it has truly been definitely decided that Israel will not permit foreign elements to dictate to it its settlement policy in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, why have we not seen in those same areas a single new settlement since the Knesset gave its confidence to Yitzhaq Shamir's national government? It is somewhat stupid to be stubborn with the Americans about our right to settle anywhere in the land of Israel and also lose \$400 million, when our policy calls for no new settlements.

American satellites can testify that, since last winter, no new Israeli points have sprung up on the map of Judaea and Samaria, except for Arens' silly military outposts, and one neighborhood that was built in Kfar Adumim during the coalition crisis. The only place in which a new settlement has sprouted is actually on the green line, not far from Ben-Shemen. There too, the settlement in question was established by a completely private initiative, without any help from the government. The orthodox who are building a city at that site, called Kiryat Sefer, received building permits several years ago. Only now, quite coincidentally, have they decided to actualize the option. It is rumored that, as soon as work began on the site, the project's initiators received a high-level appeal to suspend construction work, because of "political constraints" and other routine excuses. It is fortunate that they totally disregarded the appeal.

What is to be done with members of the Likud, for they have yet to liberate themselves from the cursed revisionist practice of talking instead of acting. The land cannot be built through proud declarations made to Secretary Baker. The settlement enterprise in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza perhaps does not need additional settlements at present to double and quadruple itself demographically (the settlement enterprise is now enjoying its highest population growth ever). However, in the long term, the failure to establish additional settlements will loosen the moral foundation underpinning the settlement enterprise. Americans will ultimately

transfer to us the \$400 million, even twice that amount, when it becomes clear to them that construction deals on the other side of the green line are being concluded as usual. It is a fact that Gorbachev is now renewing direct flights [to Israel for Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union], although he is well aware that a large segment of the passengers will reach Qiryat Arba' sooner or later.

Party Attitudes Toward New Immigrants

91AE0083A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
1 Oct 90 p 1B

[Article by Lili Galili]

[Text] In their handling of the absorption of immigration, the parties are joining other systems that lag permanently behind events. The parties' non-involvement in the process could be seen as a positive expression of statehood, were it not possible to predict, already now, that the immigrants will assume a central place in election propaganda. The Likud will claim that everything is to its credit, the Labor Alignment will claim that everything is because of the Likud, Tehiya will promise the immigrants a large land of Israel to absorb them, RATZ [Citizens' Rights Movement] will recall that no one understands the importance of human rights like it, and MAPAM [United Workers Party] will seek to convince them that there is another socialism.

All of this is expected to occur within about the next two years. In the meantime, the parties have no significant role in the absorption of immigration. It is reasonable to assume that, precisely as in the case of the development towns and [poor] neighborhoods, they will arrive on the scene at the last moment, to be asked the eternal question: "Where were you all these years when we needed you?" This teaches us that, between complete neglect and manipulative propaganda, the parties do not know how to play an effective role in the life of the state, except, of course, their establishment of absorption committees and symbolic seminars that reach only a few immigrants.

This reality can be explained by a number of complex reasons. Like other systems, the parties are finding it difficult to digest the masses of new immigrants, who appear foreign and threatening to them. The party mechanisms are prepared to contend with a known reality and a focused, social structure. The new immigrants, whose human and political profile differs from that of their predecessors, are a mystery with which no one knows how to cope.

As a rule, the right treats the immigrants as money in its pocket. The left, despite its declarations, relates to them as a lost potential. Neither approach is justified.

The few surveys that have been conducted in this area in fact indicate a clear tendency on the part of immigrants toward the parties of the right. However, more than this, they are showing confusion and perplexity, which is fertile ground for the political socialization process. A

survey conducted not long ago by researchers at the Hebrew University among immigrants who arrived last year indicates that about 70 percent of them support the parties of the right. This figure is not surprising. More surprising is the fact that 30 percent of the immigrants identify with parties that are left of center, even before being exposed to any type of contact with them.

Another interesting piece of data indicates that nine percent of those surveyed support the Kakh movement, which can be explained by the extensive activity of that movement among the immigrants, especially in Jerusalem. On the other hand, the survey shows that a surprisingly high number of immigrants, 12 percent, support the internationalization of Jerusalem under the auspices of the United Nations. A sovietologist, Professor Dimitri Segel, attributes this finding to the Russian immigrants' view that outstanding economic advantages regarding taxes and duties would be available in an international city.

An analysis of the survey data shows a complex picture: In contrast to the accepted opinion, the immigrants are not in the pocket of the right. Their relatively high support of Kakh indicates the importance of personal, immediate contact, which they do not get from the other movements. All of the conflicting concepts that emerge from the survey testify to confusion, which indicates that the immigrants are not captivated by any of the ideological package deals to which we have become accustomed on both the right and the left.

All of these factors constitute suitable terrain for party activity among the immigrants, who would be seen not as a mystery, but as an integral part in the process of their social absorption. The parties' lack of activity among the immigrants inheres deeply within the Israeli experience: the parties are simply afraid. The polarization rumbling beneath the surface between the Afro-Asiatic layers of society in distress in the neighborhoods and development towns on the one hand, and the new immigrants on the other, is paralyzing the parties in a balance of fear.

This fear is especially strong in the Labor Party, which is afraid of losing its support among these layers if it is perceived as the "party of the immigrants." This is certainly not a worthwhile deal for the Likud. Ultimately, not much has been done except talk. The Labor Party is currently considering the publication of a monthly in the Russian language (in addition to the daily NASHA STRAWNA [Our Country], which is connected to the Labor Party), and it is developing seminars for immigrants, to which it continues to send Histadrut [labor federation] workers lacking in grace, but able to speak Russian.

The Russians themselves are expressing amazement at the lack of such activity. In contrast to the prevailing opinion, the immigrants are not "saturated with politics," but are actually thirsting to become integrated in the democratic political system. A veteran Russian

activist states: "The active party will be the winner, but no one is exploiting that correctly." The measure taken by the Labor Party to cancel its symbols was perceived as positive, but inadequate. The Labor Party, as it looks on all sides to curry favor with the immigrants, is neutralized by the threats of the Histadrut to stop the economy, which arouses antagonism among the immigrants.

Into this vacuum enter the Russians themselves. As in other areas of absorption in which the established systems are not providing enough assistance, the Russians are helping themselves. Without housing—three families are crowded into a single apartment—they are locating and supplying employment to each other. Private absorption companies formed by Russians are supplanting the formal absorption system. In the same spirit, without a party that will bring them into its fold, they are seeking to establish their own party. Due to its shortcomings, Israeli democracy, which could profit from the wave of immigration through the role the immigrants could play in reducing the relative power of the ethnic-orthodox parties, is liable to be enriched by another ethnic party.

Six Proposals on Status of Temple Mount

91AE0062B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
12 Oct 90 p 5B

[Text]

What To Do? What Not To Do—A Document

In the mid-1970s, Teddy Kollek encouraged and also initiated thinking, recommendations, and all kinds of position papers, apparently theoretical, on different possibilities for Arab participation in government in Jerusalem. With time, a considerable amount of paper has accumulated on his desk. Most of the papers were generated by "advisors for Arab affairs" employed in different governmental ministries, and most of the papers were supposed to remain secret, although some were leaked when they were written, or subsequently. Some are still relevant.

One such document, from April 1974, enumerated a list of "mathematical possibilities," as the document described them, for organizing authority over the Temple Mount. The following is stated in it:

A. Political Assumptions

(a) Basic Assumptions of Israeli Policy

1. United Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and there must be no agreement to any solution that harms the unity of Israeli Jerusalem.
2. The rights of members of the two religions shall be upheld pursuant to Article 1 of the Protection of the Holy Places Law which states: "The holy places shall be protected from desecration and any other harm, and from anything that is liable to harm the freedom of

access of members of the religions to the places holy to them, or their sensitivity toward those places."

(b) The Basic Arab Assumption

The Arab states demand the return to Arab control of the entire area that constituted Jordanian East Jerusalem on the eve of the Six Day War (isolated voices have expressed a willingness to concede, in the absence of an alternative, the Jewish Quarter, including the Western Wall, and perhaps the Armenian Quarter as well, in order to guarantee access [by Jews] to the Western Wall and the new Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem).

B. The Existing Situation

Description:

(a) De facto control of the Temple Mount, except for the Mograbis' Gate, is currently in the hands of a body that calls itself the "Muslim Council," which is composed of a number of notables and religious figures from East Jerusalem who appointed themselves to be the council after the start of Israeli rule. The council has no legal status under Jordanian or Israeli law. However, that does not prevent it from taking action regarding all matters pertaining to the maintenance of buildings, lighting, the organization of a guard composed of stewards, and the organization of matters related to ritual and religion. The council acts on the basis of a practical, political, administrative, and economic connection to the Government of Jordan, and it receives directions from it.

According to Muslim law, the test for acknowledging Muslim sovereignty over any territory is the mention of a Muslim ruler's name in the Friday sermons in the large mosques and the minting of money. Currently, no ruler is mentioned during the Friday sermons, as is the custom of Muslims living under a non-Muslim government.

(b) Entrance to the Temple Mount through its access gates, except the Mograbis' Gate, is under the control of the "Muslim Council," which collects entrance fees from those entering through these gates. The council also collects entrance fees from persons entering through the Mograbis' Gate only if they ask to visit one of the mosques.

(c) Any person may enter the Temple Mount during the hours that are determined for that purpose, through the Mograbis' Gate, which is under Israeli control. Such a person is not required to pay an entrance fee. The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] guards that entrance.

(d) The "Mahkamah [court]," which is located next to the Temple Mount (and overlooks part of it), is under the IDF's control.

(e) The Israel police is responsible for order on the Temple Mount (as stated, a guard organized by the "council" is also on the Temple Mount). The Israel police does not permit Jews to pray in the area of the Temple Mount.

(f) The "Muslim Council" refrains from asking favors of the Israeli authorities unless it sees no way to refrain from doing so. In addition, if it does request a favor, it seeks a way to act as the heir, as it were, of an institution that exists under Jordanian law. In this way, it has been granted, as an act of grace, an exemption from taxes on certain goods required for the restoration of the interior of the al-Aqsa Mosque.

(g) In recent years, despite the protests of the "Council," archaeological excavations have been conducted along the length of western and eastern walls of the Temple Mount.

Advantages for Israel:

(1) Physical Israeli control of the Temple Mount has been secured, based on which free access for Jews to the Temple Mount has been established.

(2) A separation has been maintained between the Muslim establishment in Jerusalem and the Muslim establishment in Israel.

(3) The existing situation is the best that can be achieved under the current circumstances, within the bounds of maintaining freedom of access and ritual, and the Muslims' rules of self-administration in their holy places.

Disadvantages for Israel:

(1) In the framework of a single state, a two-fold institutional system is being formed, which also has an effect on the lives on Muslims in Israel.

(2) In the absence of an Arab, political factor in Jerusalem, the Council has from time to time assumed the functions of a political representation for the Arabs of East Jerusalem, Judaea, and Samaria, and it supports anti-Israel Arab political goals.

(3) The fact that the "council" has not been recognized creates different legal difficulties; it also causes feelings of insult and bitterness in the Muslim establishment, which views the existing situation as part of an Israeli "plan" aimed at evicting the Muslims from their holy places.

(4) Certain Jewish circles seeking to pray on the Temple Mount oppose the existing situation. Against this background, there were a number of violent attacks in which both Jews and Arabs were involved, and the police were forced to act to restore order.

Advantages for the Arabs:

(1) The mosques on the Temple Mount are actually under the exclusive control of a Muslim element that possesses and administers them for all intents and purposes.

(2) The principle that, from the standpoints of religious ritual and daily life, the Temple Mount is in the hands of Muslim Arabs, without intervention by the Israeli Government, remains.

(3) The connection between the Muslim establishment in Jerusalem on the one hand, and the Jordanian Government and the populations of Jerusalem, Judaea, and Samaria on the other hand, has been maintained.

(4) Jews are prohibited from praying in the area of the Temple Mount.

Disadvantages for the Arabs:

(1) Israelis regard the Temple Mount as part of the state of Israel. Israeli Army and police forces guard the Temple Mount, which is therefore under Israeli control.

(2) Autonomy on the Temple Mount is not protected by any legal arrangement and is dependent on arrangements made by the Israeli Government, so long as the latter does not decide to behave otherwise.

(3) In the absence of a permanent legal arrangement, the Muslims fear what they view as Jewish penetration into the Temple Mount. They point to Israeli control over the Mograbis' Gate and the Mahkamah, the collapse of houses in the area of excavations near the Western Wall, the demands of different Jewish groups to worship on the Temple Mount, and different declarations in that regard.

C. Possibilities

A First Possibility: Maintenance of the Existing Situation

Advantages and Disadvantages: As stated above.

A Second Possibility: Full Integration

Description: The creation of a single, state establishment for the Muslims of Israel that would also include the Muslims of East Jerusalem. This establishment would be responsible for arrangements on the Temple Mount and would be anchored in the law of the Knesset.

Advantages for Israel:

(1) The assurance of Israeli control from a legal standpoint (in addition to the indirect control that currently exists) over what happens on the Temple Mount and over the very establishment that would be created.

(2) It would be possible to sever the link of the "council" to the Government of Jordan.

(3) It would be possible to overcome legal difficulties stemming from the lack of recognition of the existing "council."

Disadvantages for Israel:

(1) The creation of a central Muslim body would pose a danger, because such a body could gain control over the Arabs of Israel, given the existence of a strong, political, religious, Arab-Muslim leadership in East Jerusalem.

(2) The direct involvement of the state of Israel in religious, Muslim, internal affairs, which are especially sensitive, has not occurred to date.

(3) The actualization of this possibility could cause a grave crisis in relations with the Arabs of East Jerusalem and the territories.

Advantages for the Arabs: None

Disadvantages for the Arabs: This solution is unlikely to be accepted by any Muslim element, because it would grant de jure control over the Temple Mount and Muslim institutions to the Israeli Government.

A Third Possibility: Division of Jerusalem

Description: The transfer of sovereignty over the Temple Mount and Muslim neighborhoods (inside and outside the walls of the old city) to the authority of an Arab state, which would result in the complete separation of those areas from Israel.

Advantages for Israel: The removal of one of the main stumbling blocks in negotiations with the Arabs.

Disadvantages for Israel:

(1) This solution contradicts the basic assumptions regarding a united Jerusalem and free access for Jews to the Temple Mount.

(2) This possibility is unlikely to be accepted by any influential Israeli element.

Advantages for the Arabs: They would obtain their maximum demand.

Disadvantages for the Arabs: None

A Fourth Possibility: The Annexation of the Temple Mount To an Arab State

Description: The Temple Mount would be annexed to an Arab state to which it would be connected by an international corridor (or, in the absence of such a corridor, the Temple Mount would be annexed as an enclave). This would entail the complete separation of the Temple Mount from the state of Israel. However, this would occur under an international agreement that would provide for free access to the Temple Mount by anyone wanting it.

Advantages to Israel:

(1) The existing situation of free access for Jews to the Temple Mount would be ensured.

(2) The presentation of the matter within an international framework would facilitate negotiations on other subjects related to Jerusalem.

Disadvantages for Israel:

(1) This possibility contradicts the basic assumptions regarding the indivisibility of the city.

(2) If control is transferred, and the new controlling party breaches the international agreement, there would be no means to redress the breach, as proven by the experience with the article pertaining to access to the holy sites in the Cease-Fire Agreement of 1949.

(3) Municipal and other difficulties would result from a separation.

(4) This possibility, if realized, would encourage the Arabs to put forth claims to annex other areas in East Jerusalem.

Advantages to Arabs: This possibility would return control of Muslim holy sites to a Muslim ruler, which is a central point in the Arabs's view.

Disadvantages for the Arabs:

(1) There would be a more prominent separation between the Muslim neighborhoods and the Temple Mount, which would be politically unacceptable.

(2) Municipal difficulties would ensue from the separation.

A Fifth Possibility: Placement of the Temple Mount Outside the Sovereignty of Any State

Description: A determination, in an international agreement, that the Temple Mount is not located within the sovereign territory of any state, but is under the control of a recognized Muslim institution subject to two premises: First, that it would remain within the boundaries of the municipality of Jerusalem; and second, that access would be guaranteed to all. Under such an international agreement, the following would be determined: arrangements for the election or appointment of the above-mentioned Muslim institution with the participation of an Arab Government; guard arrangements; cooperation between the two governments regarding the provision of public utilities; the preservation of public order; jurisdiction regarding violations in the area of the Temple Mount; exemptions from taxes and duties; and immunity from legal proceedings.

Advantages to Israel:

(1) The unity of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and freedom of access for Jews would be preserved.

(2) An international connection with the Israeli Government would be maintained regarding various matters.

(3) Sovereignty would not be given to another party.

Disadvantages for Israel:

(1) The concession of political sovereignty, which is currently held by Israel.

(2) The transfer of control over the Temple Mount to a Muslim element.

(3) The creation of a precedent that could be applied to Christian holy sites.

(4) The Muslim establishment would, practically speaking, draw its status and power from an Arab Government, and it would establish a connection with that government regarding the daily administration of the Temple Mount.

Advantages for the Arabs:

(1) The guarantee of Muslim control over the Temple Mount in the absence of Israeli authority, through the reduction of the Israeli Government's involvement to a minimum.

(2) From a purely Muslim legal standpoint, if not from a Muslim political standpoint, this possibility would satisfy demands for Muslim control over the Temple Mount.

(3) It would be possible to ensure the influence of an Arab state over the appointment of the "council."

Disadvantages for the Arabs:

(1) Sovereignty would not be given to an Arab ruler.

(2) A connection with the Israeli Government would necessarily persist, because the Temple Mount would remain within the boundaries of the municipality of Jerusalem, and because the connection to the Israeli Government regarding vital matters would remain.

A Sixth Possibility: Inclusion of the Temple Mount Within an Autonomous, Urban Framework for the Arabs of the City

Description: Assuming the implementation of some urban framework for the Arabs of Jerusalem within the municipality of united Jerusalem inside Israeli territory, the Temple Mount would be administered by an elected or appointed Muslim institution, and free access would be guaranteed to all. (A sub-possibility: Nominal, Arab sovereignty, as represented by the display of the flag of an Arab state, a uniformed guard, the right of a Muslim ruler to deliver the Friday sermon, and currency that would have the status of legal tender in the area of the Temple Mount and the international corridor.)

Advantages to Israel: Political control would remain in the hands of Israel and access to the Temple Mount for Jews would be guaranteed.

Disadvantages for Israel:

(1) De facto control of the Temple Mount would pass to a Muslim element.

(2) If the sub-possibility mentioned in the previous paragraph is accepted, de jure control would pass to the Arabs.

(3) This solution poses the danger of the division of Jerusalem in the future, inasmuch as it would provide for the creation of separate institutions for the Arabs of East Jerusalem, particularly if the display of an Arab flag is permitted, a guard from an Arab state is introduced, and an international corridor is created.

Advantages to the Arabs:

(1) Muslim administration of the Temple Mount would be guaranteed.

(2) A connection would be created between the Temple Mount and an Arab state.

(3) The connection between the Temple Mount and the Muslim Arab community in Jerusalem would be preserved by means of an Arab sub-municipality.

(4) Municipal arrangements would be made with the Arab sub-municipality.

(5) The Arabs would be able to view this as an intermediary solution that would not preclude possible developments desirable to them.

Disadvantages for the Arabs:

(1) Israeli sovereignty would be maintained, at least formally.

(2) Israeli law and administrative statutes would be in effect, except regarding matters determined by agreement between the parties.

Viability of Defense Ministry Advisory Team

91AE0062A Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
19 Oct 90 p 13

[Article by Avi Benyahu]

[Text] The chief of general staff, very much like the major generals in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], was surprised to receive a report that appeared in a newspaper at the beginning of week, which heralded the defense minister's intention to establish, at his side, a small team of advisors to counsel him on matters of security and strategy. The major generals, who have begun to become accustomed to the current defense minister's surprises and original initiatives in his second tenure as defense minister, also raised an eyebrow. "Whatever goes round, comes back," stated one of the major generals. Moshe Arens, whose first decision in his previous tenure was to immediately disband the national security unit established by his predecessor, Ari'el Sharon, is now himself establishing a "national security unit," albeit on a very small scale.

It is explained in the Defense Ministry that Arens decided to establish a limited team of advisors, which is to include senior officers and professional civilians, to obtain an angle of thinking that would be in addition to that of the IDF general staff. He is asking such a unit, which will be attached to his bureau and will operate under his supervision, to examine, and make recommendations on, weighty issues such as the policy on using force in the territories, the security concept in different areas, etc.

Security elements emphasized immediately that the new unit in the minister's bureau is to be established in coordination with the Defense Ministry's Director General, Major General (reserves) David 'Ivri, who is also to supervise and coordinate the team's work. This emphasis is intended primarily to signal to 'Ivri that Arens has no intentions of diminishing the director general's areas of responsibility.

Lack of Confidence

In the general staff, by contrast, most of the major generals interpret Arens' intention as an expression of his lack of confidence in the IDF's general staff.

One major general states: "There is here a strong blow against the authority of the chief of general staff, who was the defense minister's exclusive advisor regarding military topics and the development and procurement of combat means. The defense minister reached the conclusion, after his previous tenure in the same position, that he needs such a staff at his side, so that he can obtain an alternative outlook to the one provided of the general staff. In his current tenure, Arens is afraid of stumbling in his decisionmaking and is seeking tools on which to rely, so that his decisions in the military-security area will be of a better quality," states the same major general.

The major generals learned in the first weeks of 1990 that their lives will not be easy under Arens' current tenure. Arens is attempting, with the help of his advisors and aides, to become free of the image of an "outsider," which the IDF major generals attached to him in his earlier tenure, and he is demonstrating great decision-making ability.

On the way to the decision that is taking shape, Arens has managed to examine and reject the multi-year plan that the IDF general staff toiled to prepare. Arens found that the plan is not compatible with the forecasted budget and is too ambitious. He would want the plan, which involves millions of dollars, to be examined by an additional professional body, which would advise him during the final decisionmaking process. He would want such a body to also examine the need for submarines, missile boats, and Patriot missiles, and to form a security concept and the specifications for building the IDF's order of forces. For example, he cannot understand to this day how the IDF general staff came to an unequivocal decision regarding the urgent need to terminate the Lavi' aircraft project, which was the apple of his eye. As far as Arens is concerned, the cancellation of the Lavi' is a "blemish" on the structure of the existing general staff, because it reached that decision without the benefit of an opposing view being put forth by another professional body in the security system. Because of that decision, his complicated relations with the Air Force leadership at present are a subject in itself.

A Second National Security Unit

Moshe Arens, like others in the political and security echelon, thinks that "the urgent puts off the important"

in general staff deliberations. He is interested in a team of experts that would deal with major national security issues. The Knesset foreign affairs and defense committee is perceived in the security system (and also in the IDF) as a body that has not proven its ability to supervise the Army's operations and weave together the lines of a national security concept.

"The committee has neither uncovered defects, nor precluded erroneous decisions by the Army and security system in advance. There is an urgent need for a body that would operate at the defense minister's side," states a senior security element.

As Arens' intention gathers momentum, the concerns of the IDF's chief of general staff and major generals are growing. Members of the general staff fear a return to the national security unit model established by Ariq Sharon, which was headed by Major General Avrasia Tamir. There is a fear that a small team of four to five experts, officers and civilians would shortly become a unit of twenty to thirty persons with their aides, coordination officers, etc., i.e., a body that would compete with the general staff, erode its authorities, and torpedo its recommendations as they make their way to a final decision, which is usually made by the defense minister's bureau.

Against this background, it is worthwhile to examine why Ari'el Sharon, when he was defense minister, established a national security unit, and why his successor, Moshe Arens, disbanded it. A senior general staff officer during the early 1980s states:

"When Ariq arrived at the Defense Ministry, he did not believe anyone, so he established the national security unit. This began with good intentions. The officers in the unit prepared staff tasks for Ariq, prepared him for important meetings and discussions in Israel and abroad, collected information for him, etc. Especially memorable were the nice graphs and good-looking maps that they sketched in the national security unit.

"In the unit, Ariq employed architect Shmu'el 'Inav, who went into real estate deals in the territories after the dissolution of the national security unit. When it exited, the national security unit, headed by Maj Gen Tamir, began gradually to compete and clash with the IDF's planning branch, which was headed by Major General Nati Sharon and later by Major General Ehud Baraq. The situation appraisals produced by the national security unit against the background of data that it received from the IDF caused tension between the unit and the general staff. When a decision had to be made, the defense minister would receive two recommendations, one made by the IDF, and the other by the national security unit," states the above-mentioned senior staff officer.

Efficient Auxiliary Tool

Following the Kahan committee's decisions and Sharon's resignation, Moshe Arens was recalled from

Washington to assume the post of defense minister. His first decision at the time was to suspend the national security unit, a decision which satisfied IDF commanders. Regarding that period, one of Arens' confidants explains: "The national security unit was anchored and deeply involved in the Lebanon War. Arens saw no reason to perpetuate its existence. In addition, the national security unit was competing with the general staff, especially the planning branch, and Arens did not want redundancy. An additional reason for the dissolution of the national security unit was the unique personality of Avrasa Tamir, which was unacceptable to Moshe Arens." Currently, as stated, Arens is about to establish a similar body, albeit a much smaller body with defined areas of activity.

Given the way matters appear in current information regarding Arens' intentions, it is not at all certain that the idea to establish a national security unit is such a bad one. The defense minister needs an efficient auxiliary tool to help him make policy and decisions.

A senior officer states: "The new body must be something like an expanded military secretariat that is reinforced with civilian professionals with a great deal of experience and objective discretion. It would assist the defense minister by gathering data and undertaking professional interventions when it sees that the advice placed on the minister's desk by the IDF and chief of general staff is unreasonable or contains a grease bomb." Another major general adds: "This could be an important, useful body if it manages not to rub against the general staff and is instead aided by it. Such a body would serve as a liaison between the Army and the political echelon. That is how it should be viewed."

Minister Arens has not yet decided who will head the team. Nor has the recruitment of officers and professionals for it begun.

Although IDF major generals have differing views about such a team, it seems that there is room for giving credit to the idea, whose success would of course be directly dependent on the potential for cooperation between those who work in the defense ministry, the general staff, and the team to be established. It seems that such a unit, at the defense minister's side, would also be the legacy of the next chief of general staff, who would need to accept it as a part of the system. This matter can obviously be expected to provide the media with headlines in the coming weeks and months.

Call for Armed Struggle in Territories Examined

91AE0056B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
19 Oct 90 p 2B

[Article by Dani Rubinshteyn]

[Text] The Central Committee of the PLO convened last week in Tunis, and in that session, they discussed the growing demands among the Palestinians to go back to

"armed struggle" and allow the inhabitants of the territories to use live weapons in the struggle with Israeli authorities. Those demands have been raised in recent months mainly by the radical PLO factions—the "Popular Front," and the Muslim groups, HAMAS [Islamic Resistance Movement]. Those organizations have very disparate ideological views, but nevertheless have cooperated. To the surprise of many, they distributed joint placards in the territories a while back, mainly in the Bethlehem district.

According to the bits and pieces of information that have come from the Central Committee in Tunis, they have now been joined by groups within the PLO headed by "Force 17," under the leadership of 'Abu-Tayb. This is the PLO's elite military organization, entrusted, among other things, with the personal safety of 'Arafat. Authorization for its positions were to be seen this week in the placards found in the territories requesting an armed struggle, signed by "Force 17." Security elements believe those placards were smuggled in from abroad; their style is different from the historical recommended style of HAMAS or the sharp well-known style of Popular Front placards. The Central Committee session of the PLO, which took place exactly at the time the Security Council convened to discuss the events surrounding the blood-bath on the Temple mount, dispersed without issuing any announcement at all of an official resolution on the topic. Resolutions of this sort in the PLO are generally issued under a shroud of secrecy, and their content made known only when placards of the "United Command" are published, including action instructions for residents of the territories.

Opponents of armed struggle in the territories are supporters of the central stream of the PLO, headed by 'Arafat. In recent years they have succeeded in convincing the leadership of the organization to lend the intifadah the character of a civilian revolt, of a nonviolent struggle. Their reasons were that armed struggle does not fall in line with the political system for public opinion in the U.S. and Europe. That and more—when they use live weapons, only a small number of youth join them, and the Israeli security forces have learned how to expose such organizations and prevent their activity.

'Arafat's opponents claim that nonviolent struggle, like the political efforts, has already been exhausted. It was only with great difficulty that George Habash gave his agreement (never full) to the announcement of the Palestine Committee regarding its acceptance of Resolution 242, the continuation of which was the declaration by 'Arafat of the recognition of Israel and a renunciation of acts of terror.

The inclination to go back to acts of sabotage in Israel was well felt in the territories. When the local leadership set up a hunger strike in East Jerusalem (after the murder in Rish'on letzion), groups of youth appeared before it, demanding that their leaders end "vegetarian" protests of that sort. They attacked Faysal al Husayni for condemning the terror in the Mahane Yehuda market in

Jerusalem (as a result of which one man was murdered and several other wounded). A few days later, Husayni was more cautious with regard to the attempted strike by 'Abu 'Abbas and refrained from a clear pronouncement. Furthermore, from the PLO's Acting Committee that convened in Baghdad there were clear hints that the PLO leadership did not intend to respond to a U.S. demand for an unequivocal condemnation of the action and to expel 'Abu 'Abbas from its ranks.

The debate within the PLO about the implementation of terror within Israel is more political-theoretical and not exactly practical. The Palestinians' ability to carry out serious strikes is very limited today as compared to the peak period after the Six Day War and the 1970s. The borders are sealed, and Israel has a sophisticated security apparatus, intelligence, and a lot of experience in preventing terror. Thus, if there should be a Palestinian resolution for a renewal of armed struggle within the territories, it would be more a sign of the dramatic political changes that have occurred in the area of the Gulf crisis. Despite those changes, 'Arafat and his supporters have not yet retreated from their public political positions on the matter of the political approach and the need for negotiation with the State of Israel. But it is clear that the full support of the Palestinians and the PLO for Saddam Husayn is pushing them toward a harder policy that is expressed by the demand for the use of live weapons in the territories.

As for official Israel, such a Palestinian decision, if it should come, means little one way or the other. From the point of view of the government of Yitzhaq Shamir, the PLO is simply a terrorist organization, and all its resolutions about a political solution are nothing but a fraud. The intifadah with all its components is, in any case, perceived by the government, and perhaps by a majority of the public in Israel, as a violent activity and more, even terrorist activity.

Israeli spokesmen have long since turned the stones into live weapons. They speak of shelling with stones, of ambushes of stones, and caches of stones as if they were bombs or materials of sabotage. On the "Voice of Israel" you can hear about Arab youth armed with stones. One way or another, the PLO that is captive to Iraq is incapable today of any political activity. The organization that represents the Palestinians and its relations with Israel is today dependent on the new order that will be created in the area after the Gulf crisis and not on any secret or public resolutions about a military struggle and terror.

Ze'ev Schiff Examines 'Red Lines' in Lebanon

91AE0056A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
19 Oct 90 p 1B

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] Despite the disappointment of many of the residents of the security strip over the fall of General 'Awn, Israel has no reason to be sorry over his disappearance.

In his despair he might have constituted a danger to Israel as well. We found proof of that when he befriended the Iraqis and was prepared to accept weapons from them, ground-to-ground missiles of the Frog type, and military advisors.

As is customary in Lebanon, the missiles were likely to fall into the hands of Hizballah, Palestinians, and others and be aimed at Israel. This must not be seen just in terms of direct action when we talk about the possibility of an Iraqi provocation. Baghdad might cause a war between Israel and Syria by means of a terrorist action against us, the tracks of which would lead, as it were, to Syria. Thus could Iraq break the coalition of the Arabs and the U.S. against this country. Therefore any Iraqi involvement in Lebanon is much more dangerous today. To a large degree, 'Awn has now paid the price of his friendship with Iraq. Thus Damascus got a silent go-ahead from Washington and Paris to act against him.

Jerusalem's silence about Syrian action in the Christian enclave points up the new Israeli policy toward Lebanon. That policy stands out even more when Defense Minister Moshe Arens, one of the heads of Likud, espouses it, with the source being the approach taken by Arens' predecessor in the Defense Ministry, Yitzhaq Rabin. Were we acting today according to 'Ari'el Sharon's policy as Defense Minister, Israel would now find itself at war, which would break out because of the Syrian strike against the Christian enclave. 'Ari'el Sharon's line was not to allow the Syrian army to operate in Lebanon. There could be no agreement to a strike against the Christians and certainly not to employing their air force in Lebanon.

The present policy does not ignore what was done in Beirut and in the north. But that does not oblige Israel to get into a superfluous war when no direct threat is perceived to her vital security interest (for example, a threat against the northern border and the security strip).

The present policy says that Israel will not intervene in conflicts between the various groups and communities in Lebanon. Israel will not try to impose a particular group as ruler over Beirut and will not be drawn into someone else's war, as happened in 1982. Those rules have been in operation for some time, and therefore General 'Awn was rebuffed when he (more than once) sought military aid from Israel.

We must not deal simplistically with the question of the 'red lines' established in the mid 1970's. They were intended to prevent war, not to cause a needless war. Therefore Israel didn't jump in with her eyes closed when the Syrians at the time blockaded Jounieh in order to prevent Iraqi ships from supplying 'Awn with Frog missiles. In order to do that, the Syrians brought missiles and long-range artillery into north Lebanon. Israel imagined, correctly, that upon conclusion of the action the missiles, which it saw as a threat to its security, would be withdrawn. The same was true now when Syria used some of her planes against 'Awn's headquarters.

We should not conclude thereby that Israel would react with indifference to any Syrian air action in Lebanon. It would appear that the red lines in Lebanon should be seen in the following fashion: Israel would view Syrian air action in the territories south of Beirut as a threat against herself. She continues to view as a threat the positioning of Syrian ground-to-air missiles in Lebanese territory and the permanent stationing of Syrian forces in south Lebanon.

The government of Lebanon is now faced with a hard choice: how to continue to implement its authority. One way, full of obstacles and pitfalls, would be action to dismantle the armed militias in Lebanon. Clearly, the government cannot rule and impose its authority if various armies exist in the country.

Some of those armies have tanks and cannon. That is the case with 'Amal, Hizballah, the Druze and, of course, the forces of the various Palestinian organizations and of the Sunni Muslims. That would be a difficult course, but the right one.

The second way is to turn toward Israel in order to dismantle the security strip and the South Lebanon Army, and request U.N. help in doing so. That way would probably seem easier in the eyes of the Lebanese government and the militia leaders. But in so doing, Lebanon would play into the hands of Saddam Husayn and deflect attention from the Gulf crisis.

Israel will not agree, of course, to dismantle the security strip and will continue to assist General Lahad in maintaining the Jazin enclave. Jerusalem is honestly and truly interested in the emergence of a strong, responsible Lebanese government that could prevent acts of terror from its territory, but there is still a long way to go. Dismantling the security strip, when 'Abu Nidal's people are camped near the Israeli border and thousands of armed Palestinians are in Tyre and Sidon cooperating with other militias, is an invitation to a new war in which Lebanon would be destroyed again.

LEBANON

Deputy Khachig Babikian on Economy

90AE0009B Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 17 Sep 90 p 11

[Article: "They Ask Everything of the State but Leave It Nothing"; interview of Deputy Khachig Babikian by AL-SHIRA'; date and place not given]

[Text] Several questions are raised these days on the profundity of economic measures recently announced by joint parliamentary committees, especially now that the crisis has deteriorated and worsened.

AL-SHIRA', in a quick chat, interviewed deputy Khachig Babikian about economic conditions in the country.

[AL-SHIRA'] Joint parliamentary committees called for accelerating the implementation of the al-Ta'if Agreement and for initiating militia deactivation. Is the legitimate authority ready to do so?

[Babikian] Saying that the militias are better equipped than the legitimate authority means leaving the country in a vacuum and surrendering the state, even the concept of statehood. This odd situation has been created by years of war and has brought us to the point where the dollar is worth 1,200 liras. Should we continue on this course, we would lose all our wealth and possibly even our country. Everything is forgiving except economics. The economy is vocal and we are now in an economic danger zone. It is imperative therefore that we reexamine not only our economic affairs but also our political and national affairs.

It is common knowledge that existence of the odd situation called militias has completely deprived the state of all its resources while placing all kinds of demands on it and leaving it nothing. Is that logical?

[AL-SHIRA'] You called upon the central bank, in one recommendation, to endow the national currency with relative stability. How can it do so when its reserves do not exceed \$500 million?

[Babikian] Monetary policies have multiple facets and means. That recommendation was only one of 15 inter-related recommendations targeted at the same objective. They would be ineffective unless adopted as a group. That is why we made the recommendations after intensive study. We did not make them in a vacuum but we invited debate by economic authorities in the country and consulted with fellow deputies. Only then did we deliberate and put forth this remedial plan. The recommendations build on each other. The first recommendation, for instance, quotes economic authorities that it would be difficult to effect any cure as long as the state is unable to control its ports and public domains. This is what they [the economists] said and what we reiterated at the top of the recommendations.

[AL-SHIRA'] The recommendations did not deal with certain important issues, such as the closure of factories and institutions and the emigration of the Lebanese from Gulf states. What to do about those?

[Babikian] In fact, we have dealt with that in the preamble to our report. We attributed the latest monetary crisis to Gulf events, but what do these events mean for Lebanon? Essentially three things: interruption of remittances from expatriates in the Gulf, cessation of industrial and other Lebanese exports to the Gulf, and higher oil prices. This is how the Gulf crisis impacts Lebanon, and our recommendations were certainly given in light of that analysis.

[AL-SHIRA'] But don't you think that there is laxity in dealing with those issues?

[Babikian] Yes, there is. We notice that even though the recommendations are all interrelated, the focus is on the first point which deals with normalizing irregular conditions and terminating insurrection. I blame the government because the Chamber [of deputies] gave those recommendations due attention and unanimously adopted them. The committee concentrated on research for three or four days, and the vote was taken immediately afterwards. The council of ministers had a meeting 24 hours later but unfortunately did not deal with the issue. This is a big shame because government must inspire public confidence that it is diligent.

The chamber meant to create an initiative for dealing with the crisis and would not have otherwise intervened since it is the government's function to deal with economic and social issues and adopt needed measures. The chamber's function, on the other hand, is to legislate and maintain oversight over the government but wanted in that particular case to sidestep certain considerations and took it upon itself to direct the government to adopt effective measures.

[AL-SHIRA'] It is common knowledge that the General Federation of Labor did not take part in joint committee meetings but has called for escalating the situation. How will the committee reconcile with union and federation positions?

[Babikian] The specialized committee has in fact concluded its role by submitting those recommendations. There is no doubt, however, that each of us sympathizes with the people's tragedy and its woes. We follow the issues daily, though in different capacities. We are assiduous in understanding, examining, and following up on all demands and especially those of labor which we accord every concern. I am personally still hopeful for a meeting between the federation and a number of deputies, either within the chamber or outside it, because we are sympathetic to all just demands. A dialogue with the federation can only be useful.

Economist on Crisis, Possible Solutions

91AE0009A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic
10 Sep 90 pp 20-21

[Article by Nagat Sharaf-al-Din: "Dr. Kamal Hamdan: Dollarized to Ward Off Collapse"; interview of economist Dr. Kamal Hamdan by AL-SHIRA'; date and place not given]

[Text] Current onerous living conditions are giving rise to questions as to whether a solution is possible, even in part, to the deteriorating and worsening economic situation, and consequently to the future of the country as a whole.

AL-SHIRA' interviewed economist Dr. Kamal Hamdan on reasons and possible solutions for the current economic crisis.

[AL-SHIRA'] It is understood that the economic situation is tied to the political situation. To what extent did Gulf events contribute to dollar rate hikes?

[Hamdan] It would be appropriate and worthwhile for a discussion of the economic impact of Gulf events and a review of living conditions in Lebanon, to briefly examine the Lebanese economy on the eve of those events.

The Lebanese economy was essentially undergoing a crisis on the eve of Gulf events, primarily as a result of the wars for "liberation" and "neutralization." A review of the past 4 or 5 years would reveal that the Lebanese economy was booming in 1987 as evidenced by several indicators and confirmed by the Bank of Lebanon in its annual reports for '87 and '88. Despite adverse political conditions, the Lebanese economy adjusted in '87 and '88 and enjoyed relative prosperity compared to previous years. The gross domestic product [GDP] rose and so did exports. Industry was essentially in a growth pattern and agriculture was in fairly good shape; then came the "war of liberation" followed by the "war of neutralization." The economic situation was rife with crises on the eve of Gulf events as a consequence of those two wars which caused damaged ranging from \$300 million to \$400 million in addition to GDP loss of income, or income foregone, estimated at 25 to 30 percent in 1989. The domestic product continued to decline in 1990 under conditions filled with crises and problems.

Events in the Gulf

[AL-SHIRA'] Would you agree that outgoing transfers and the Gulf crisis were primarily responsible for the decline in the rate of the Lebanese lira?

[Hamdan] Events in the Gulf essentially ended, or greatly shrank, Lebanese expatriate remittances. Incoming remittances were estimated in 1988 at between \$1 million and \$1.5 million, or approximately 40 to 50 percent of GDP. Events in Kuwait caused more than the discontinuation of remittances from Kuwait. Recent bank closures and the devaluation of the Kuwaiti dinar to about 7 or 8 percent of original value not only put an end to Kuwaiti remittances of some \$100 million or \$150 million annually but also shook the banking and monetary foundations of the Gulf economy as a whole, seriously undermining monetary inflows into Lebanon from other Gulf countries.

It is difficult at the moment to tell whether this situation will continue because it is a function of future developments in the region and of whether the crisis will dissipate or intensify. For instance, should this no-peace no-war situation protract, I would expect a sharp decline in possible remittances from Gulf countries other than Kuwait. The Gulf crisis has also deprived Lebanon of export revenues because it closed Gulf markets to exported Lebanese goods. The events have also tragically impacted our fuel bill. Not only did remittances decline and export revenues dry up, but I also expect our fuel bill

to double in U.S. dollar terms. For instance, our petroleum imports used to cost us between \$250 million and \$300 million. Should matters continue on their current course, the bill for the same quantity [of petroleum imports] will rise to between \$500 million and \$750 million. The fuel bill, which could possibly reach \$500 million, may increase by more than two-fold or even 10-fold depending on the lira's future rate of exchange vis-a-vis the dollar since the income of most Lebanese, and especially employees, continues to be denominated in liras.

[AL-SHIRA'] The status of the Bank of Lebanon is another element tied to Gulf events. What role does the bank play under current conditions?

[Hamdan] The crises and problems of the Bank of Lebanon are not borne out of Gulf events. The wars of "liberation" and of "neutralization" are primarily responsible for the damage, and their impact had to somehow jar the lira and the Bank of Lebanon in particular. The bank's foreign currency reserves declined by more than half over the past 1.5 years. The Bank of Lebanon is supposed to finance certain outlays and is also mandated, rightfully or wrongfully, to intervene in defense of the lira on exchange markets, forcing it to buy large sums for dollars. This caused its reserves to decline to their current level of no more than \$500 million.

Intervention by the Bank of Lebanon will not therefore be wondrous or magical. It is my estimation that with the exception of some cosmetic action, the Bank of Lebanon has lost its ability to intervene. Current living conditions are best treated by accelerating the move towards a political solution.

Options

[AL-SHIRA'] How do we ameliorate the current state of monetary deterioration?

[Hamdan] Continued monetary deterioration may only be halted in one of two ways. In addition to steps announced by the council of ministers, which are only a drop in the bucket [?], there must be diligence to contain stress. One option is to 'dollarize' wages, since all goods are now priced in dollars. Only labor has not been dollarized. Another option is to immediately float wages relative to the cost of living, thereby instituting monthly adjustments to price increases. This, in my estimation, does not escalate wages but would be a commitment by the state and by employers to protect their minimum purchasing power, thereby enabling workers to return to their jobs daily. We will otherwise arrive at a state of "civil disobedience."

[AL-SHIRA'] Where do you stand on the recent debate to utilize the treasury's gold reserves?

[Hamdan] I don't believe that utilizing gold is a solution under current conditions until we reach a comprehensive, or nearly comprehensive, political settlement; until the insurrection is terminated; until the state regains control of all

public functions; until militia dissolution is begun; and until centralized authority is reactivated and restored to the country. There must be political consensus by most of the factions and political forces in this country. Short of this, any thought of expending the gold reserves would be a measure fraught with extreme risk and would strike the final blow to the country's foundations.

Ways to Deal With Economic Crisis Discussed

90AE0009C London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
21 Sep 90 p 44

[Dispatch from Beirut: "The Dollar in the Red Zone while Lebanese Citizens Cry: 'Enough Is Enough!' "]

[Text] What more can be said about the economic situation in Lebanon now that exchange rates are at 1,200 liras to the U.S. dollar, more than 2,000 liras to the sterling, and more than 200 liras to the French franc? What else can be said about that situation except that it has reached a stage of actual and total collapse? The stock exchange has declined to operate [as published]. The Central Bank of Lebanon has stopped setting exchange rates for foreign currencies. Most daily sales to retailers are denominated in U.S. dollars. Many bets on saving the situation in Lebanon were off as the new Gulf crisis exploded. Numerous are the indications of grave danger threatening the Lebanese economy.

Even though certain economic sources see light at the end of the tunnel once political reforms are implemented within the framework of the al-Ta'if Agreement, the obstacle still remains. Sources believe it will probably continue to be in place at least through this month until it is clear what is to become of General Michel 'Awn. In addition, the recent Gulf crisis impacted the Lebanese situation as a whole and prompted droves of Lebanese expatriates to return home from Kuwait, Iraq, and the Gulf region in general. Furthermore, the initial meeting to launch the International Arab Fund for Lebanon has been postponed.

An economic source summarized the new/old reasons for the worsening economic crisis and revealed what officials view as possible solutions or remedies.

Reasons for the deteriorating crises fall into four major categories:

1- The war of liberation waged by Gen. 'Awn propelled the crisis into its new trajectory.

2- In spite of the al-Ta'if Agreement, the war of neutralization, or attempts at neutralization, between Gen. 'Awn and the army units he commands on one hand and Dr. Samir Ja'ja' and the Lebanese Forces as a whole on the other hand, added to the economic destruction wreaked by the war of liberation on the infrastructure, based in the eastern region, which was held to be the economy's saving reserves, according to the source.

3- The slow pace of implementing the al-Ta'if Agreement emphasized that "no one is better than another." In other words, the legitimate authority itself—al-Harawi's administration, al-Huss government, and the deputies—is wavering. That caused many bets to be off.

4. The fourth—an unexpected development—was the new Gulf crisis and its combined economic and political impact on Lebanon. It drove the entire economy into a dark tunnel, resulting in this new crunch.

Contributing factors are: the possibility of a renewed struggle for power in Lebanon as [the parties to the conflict] take advantages of new variables introduced by the new Gulf crisis; the end of a major and essential source of funds represented in remittances, entirely in convertible currencies, by expatriates throughout the Gulf region; and the return of a significant number of expatriate workers is creating a new burden and denotes an end to the opportunities for immigration and work abroad. The situation of the Lebanese in Liberia and Africa helped the Gulf crisis close that Lebanese opportunity. The war in Liberia drove many of them back to Lebanon where they were only recently a singular source of inflows and an incessant economic driving force.

All those and other reasons were evident, according to the source, but they have become even more clearly crystallized. Collectively, and especially the Gulf crisis, they caused the cancellation, without rescheduling, of the meeting to found the "maintenance fund" originally scheduled for 10 September.

What are possible exits from this economic quagmire?

The source said that Lebanese official sources leaked an expected major source of relief when they pointed out that they were informed of the possibility that Lebanon might benefit from aid to countries injured by the new Gulf crisis. The source did not confirm whether this has been decided and whether Lebanon has been officially put on the list of injured countries which is [so far] limited to Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Syria. Official sources assert, however, that they have reason to believe that some gain will accrue to Lebanon now that the Gulf crisis has thwarted the founding of the aforementioned "maintenance fund."

But the issue here, according to the source, is how Lebanon can utilize that aid once it is received. Some opine that the funds should be deposited in Lebanese banks to the account of the Lebanese State in order to boost balances and foreign currency reserves. Others believe that the funds should be used to finance reconstruction in secure regions of the country. All such actions, however, must await the final step in the Lebanese war—the fate of Gen. 'Awn, or more plainly, the fate of authorities and forces under his command.

Meanwhile, Lebanese authorities have drawn an emergency plan, for whatever it is worth, to save what can be saved. This plan, according to the source, mandates the following measures, among others:

1- The state should take control of the ports, especially Beirut harbor which is of primary importance. The "Lebanese Forces" which control the harbor have reiterated alliance with and support of the legitimate authority and [have also moved] towards the ports of Sidon, Tripoli, and perhaps even Sur. All are ports that would give the state control of foreign trade and endow it with an effective international presence [as published].

2- The state should immediately act to collect overdue fees [and taxes] from individuals and institutions. These range from customs duties to charges for water, electricity, telephone services, car mechanics, etc.

3- The state must regain the monopoly over the import of all combustibles such as gasoline, diesel, gas, and other fuels. The market for combustibles has expanded, fragmented, and been subjected to monopolistic plays that drove gasoline prices to record highs and will drive heating fuel costs to dangerous levels as winter approaches. This took place even though the importation of fuel is restricted to the state. It was recently discovered that commodity was in short supply and electric generation was interrupted as a consequence.

4- The state has made a preliminary decision to resume operations at al-Zahrani refinery as part of its solution to the shortage of combustibles. This step, however, is hampered not so much by technical problems as it is by political and security considerations. The refinery remains surrounded by tensions in the al-Tuffah region and in east Sidon.

5- The decree against pricing goods in U.S. dollars must be firmly and strictly enforced. The dollar must not be used for day-to-day purchases. Most shops and stores in Beirut and the regions now refuse to sell unless payment is in dollars. This caused dollars to become rare and scarce and added to the tragedy of people unable to retain or procure them. Such action, however, requires an effective state apparatus to oversee and actually enforce—which is difficult under current conditions. The prohibition of dollar pricing must be accompanied with persistent insistence on using the national currency for all transactions regardless of type and size and regardless of the commodity involved.

6- Diligent belt-tightening must be enforced at all ministries and agencies, and especially with regard to outlays by ministers and deputies. No outlay should be expended unless necessary to make the lives of citizens easier. Belt-tightening requires Audit Bureau oversight of minister expenditures, but in advance. Urgent need and the amounts allotted must first be divulged and prior approval obtained before being expended.

The source who summarized the steps above revealed that there were renewed calls for liquefying a portion of the "gold cover" in order to rescue the economy. Advocates of such action believe that state-held gold is meant for just such difficult times and that liquidating just 10 percent of the gold would tide the state over its current crunch.

The state has responded firmly by asserting that any gold liquidation would only destroy whatever confidence remains in the national currency and would undermine Lebanon's world economic position. There is no guarantee, it added, that liquefying a portion of the gold would solve the economic crisis which has turned into a bottomless basket that retains nothing placed in it. There is no guarantee that the sums raised by liquidating a portion of the gold would not dissipate in a matter of days, especially since the exchange market is in disarray and has been taken over by brokers and speculators. Under such conditions, the state would be obliged to administer the liquidation, and the gold would gradually disappear, possibly completely, which would be the pinnacle of economic risk.

What then?

Everyone believes in waiting until the final phase of the Lebanese war is resolved either by military force or by convincing Gen. 'Awn and his supporters that the game is over. The state itself is still unable to make up its mind and reach a decision on the former option because certain officials believe it [the state] is incapable of such military action.

The fact remains, however, that Lebanese citizens are crying "Enough is enough." Hunger is knocking at the door, and the state must prove itself and justify its existence!

SAUDI ARABIA

Official Denies Market Impact From Yemeni Exodus

91AE0042A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
17 Oct 90 p 43

[Text] Despite the tragic aspect of the unfortunate events in the Gulf, those involved with the Saudi market believe that those events, even if prolonged, will have no [adverse] market impact. Rather, the events induced strong commercial activity beneficial to many food and beverage producers whose productive capacity had to be raised to unprecedented levels. Poultry and egg sales, which suffered serious oversupply problems until recently, shot up. These rapid developments are attributed to new purchasing power created by immigration from Kuwait on one hand and the presence of Arab and foreign forces on the other. Saudi products will gain a lot more opportunity over time especially now with the curtailment of imports from Jordan and Yemen even though they were mostly in fruits and vegetables.

Real estate markets also benefitted as rents rose considerably in middle-income sections where the Kuwaitis secured temporary rentals in the hope of a quick return to their occupied homeland. Homes were also bought by a small number of Kuwaitis who have Saudi roots or who wish to stay in Saudi Arabia where GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] citizens have ownership rights in accordance with the Uniform Economic Agreement. The real

estate market is expected to revert shortly to normal, or may be even below normal, now that citizens of Yemen have begun to depart in accordance with the government administrative procedures in that regard. The [Gulf] events, however, seem to have had the most impact on the stock market where trading has become noticeably light due to depressed stock prices worldwide.

It is of significance that the market for foodstuffs has been able to maintain complete normalcy since the inception of the events. Officials take pride in that and credit the market's economic course, or policy, which the authorities, and especially the ministry of commerce, found necessary to defend on several occasions.

Says Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Zamil, Saudi under-secretary of commerce for commercial affairs:

"We have no doubt succeeded so far in reaffirming the soundness of our policy to leave problem resolution to market forces. Our role is limited to oversight in order to prevent fraud. We are advocates of liberal market policies, and this helps safeguard the reputation of Saudi merchants." This, according to al-Zamil, reaffirms the soundness of the kingdom's production policies [even] under the unique domestic situation. The existing infrastructure—roads, ports, depots, and distribution networks—has accorded Saudi merchants freedom of movement and quick decisionmaking since the moment the crisis began.

AL-MAJALLAH asked Dr. al-Zamil whether the exit of Yemenis from the kingdom would have a direct impact on the market, especially since they staffed the services market, certain financial centers, small contractors, and small iron workshops.

He responded: This cannot be. The Yemeni presence was previously made possible due to unlimited facilities enjoyed by Yemeni citizens on equal footing with Saudi citizens. That gave them [the Yemenis] unfair advantage and made them partners in commerce. I believe that their withdrawal is a positive development because they provided unfair and illicit competition. The ministry had been receiving complaints in that regard, especially from gas stations and fast automotive repair shops. The departure of that force will create no vacuum thanks to the nature of the Saudi market which sometimes reached the saturation point. The market, under these conditions, will revert to perfect normalcy. The departure of Yemenis will not affect us in the least. We are sorry for the human cost to them, but that was not our doing.

Dr. al-Zamil emphasized that "it has been proven once again what we advocated to countries of the Gulf that it is necessary to make personal and national concessions in the interest of the region as a whole. That has been indubitably proven to countries of the region and indicates that a new age is on the horizon once this crisis is over."

Survey Shows Increase in Western Broadcasts' Audience

91AE0042B Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 2 Sep 90 p 8

[Article: "London, Monte Carlo, and Voice of America Broadcasts Increasingly Popular Among Arab Audiences Since the Gulf Crisis"]

[Text] Those who said that the world has become a small hamlet were most certainly cognizant of information's important and consequential role in removing barriers among peoples of the world, making man in the east quite knowledgeable with happenings in the other half of his world. The same holds true elsewhere.

An important question is: How about members of our society? They, like others on God's wide earth, are not oblivious to happenings in their universe. Their interest and followup are keenest when events relate directly to them.

This gives rise to another question: What has Arab information [media] offered Arab peoples with respect to current events in the region?

To be sure, information wars destroy whatever confidence Arab listeners may have had in the media which [seem to] live in a different age than their audience.

Other information media continue to disregard peoples' awareness in the belief that Arabs are oblivious to what happens in the world around them.

This, in most instances, induces Arab listeners and citizens to turn to the foreign media.

Take the current Gulf issue as an example. What did Arab media offer their audiences in that regard?

We will not ask many questions but we noticed the tremendous popularity of foreign broadcasts with up-to-date reports on the events as they developed. This does not mean, however, that those broadcasts were truthful or that they did not "inject poison in the honey" but at least they faithfully reported the events!

AL-RIYAD conducted the following quick citizen survey, inquiring about current broadcast preferences and trusted news sources:

All Offer News Reports and Analyses

Salih al-'Amr, a young man, says: I sometimes listen to London and sometimes to the Voice of America in addition to Saudi broadcasts. The BBC offers superior newscasts which it has extended until midnight, but its reports sometimes unnerve me especially under current conditions.

Nasir 'Ammar al-Haqabani joins in to say: Broadcasts typically offer news and analyses. I assume that the London broadcast exaggerates certain news reports and commentaries, but still I mostly listen to it.

[AL-RIYAD] What other broadcasts do you tune-in to?

[Al-Haqabani] There are the Saudi broadcasts, of course, as well as transmissions from Egypt and the UAE.

[AL-RIYAD] Do some of the news you hear cause you anxiety?

[Al-Haqabani] To be sure. One becomes apprehensive over disturbing news.

[AL-RIYAD] Do you constantly follow the news?

[Al-Haqabani] Yes. I never miss a newscast. The London broadcast is the best, and it offers continuous coverage.

When we directed a question to Mr. Al-Haqabani's younger brother, who was with him during the interview, he responded: "Don't ask me. I know nothing about that!"

God Knows Best!!

When asked about the broadcasts he tunes in to, Shaykh Marzuq al-Mutayri, a senior citizen, responded: "The London broadcast etc."

[AL-RIYAD] Do you believe that the London broadcast is accurate without a doubt?

[Al-Mutayri] I don't know. Only God would know. I believe nothing. They report events about which I have no knowledge. Everyone reports what [news] they have, and we have no knowledge!

[AL-RIYAD] Specifically, to what other broadcasts besides London do you listen?

[Al-Mutayri] We listen to France and all the major powers as well as Saudi broadcasting.

[AL-RIYAD] Do you believe that they embellish or exaggerate?

[Al-Mutayri] God only knows. As long as they don't claim that the end of the world is near ...

A senior citizen next to him began laughing so we asked his name: "Muhammad 'Abdallah."

[AL-RIYAD] Do you listen to broadcasts?

[Abdallah] Never. I never listen to broadcasts.

[AL-RIYAD] How do you follow the news?

[Abdallah] I do not follow the news or anything else.

[AL-RIYAD] Is that possible?

He answered in puzzlement: "Possible or not possible.???" A bystander tried to induce him to talk by asking: "Don't you follow the news? This brother [the reporter] merely wants your opinion." 'Abdallah responded: "God only knows. I don't follow the news or even watch television."

Only in the Car

Mr. 'Ali al-Shawish says: "I follow the London as well as the Saudi and Middle East broadcasts. I [usually] listen to the final Saudi newscast of the day. I tune in to London newscasts and commentaries whenever I am in the car, and I also listen to them at home.

[AL-RIYAD] Accurate?

[Al-Shawish] Of course not. All information media disseminate truths and untruths—frequently the latter depending on whether their sources are right or wrong.

[AL-RIYAD] Do you find exaggeration?

[Al-Shawish] Yes, by God, frequently! Take this Middle East crisis. At one point [they intimated] that war was imminent but here we are two weeks later and nothing has happened!

[AL-RIYAD] What other broadcasts do you follow?

[Al-Shawish] The Voice of America once in a while, in addition to London, of course.

[AL-RIYAD] Don't you feel the tension?

[Al-Shawish] I am disturbed over only one thing. The Arab rank and file were generally united, and there was hope for integration. This business now spoils everything.

[AL-RIYAD] Are you a diligent listener?

[Al-Shawish] No. I listen to the radio when there is a specific development, especially when I am in the car. I usually listen to London or to Riyadh. I listen to the former only for as long as developments continue.

London Exaggerates the Issues

Youthful 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-'Amran says: "I listen to London, the Voice of America, and to Cairo, especially the [latter's] noon newscast."

[AL-RIYAD] Have you been following those broadcasts for a while?

[Al-'Amran] No, of course. I have been listening to the radio only recently because of these events.

[AL-RIYAD] What attracts you to the London broadcast?

[Al-Amran] It brings you the news in full, but sometimes I feel that it exaggerates the issues. One gets apprehensive, of course, on hearing those news commentaries, etc.

[AL-RIYAD] How about accuracy?

[Al-'Amran] London sometimes elaborates on the news I hear on certain other newscasts. Those [the London reports] I believe to be accurate. However, sometimes you feel that certain reports are exaggerated and are not accurate 100 percent. They contain disinformation, in other words.

[AL-RIYAD] And the Voice of America?

[Al-'Amran] I don't listen to it as frequently but it usually agrees with the London reports.

[AL-RIYAD] Is it on par with London in accuracy?

[Al-'Amran] It is similar in most instances. It uses the same means. I imagine that under these conditions all western broadcasts would attempt some disinformation and their reports would not be accurate 100 percent. Perhaps they exploit the situation to serve other purposes.

[AL-RIYAD] Do you believe that people are aware of this?

[Al-'Amran] Some! Some of the people I talk to are firmly convinced of the utter accuracy of London broadcasts, even if misinformation is evident. In other words, they believe anything they hear on these newscasts. Some people trust, and others do not.

Poison In the Honey

Youthful Hamad Ibrahim says: "I follow the newscasts, but I listen to London most of the time."

Frankly, the problem is that no other newscasts but London's report on your problems. There are several Arab newscasts, but their reports are frequently outdated—two or three days after the fact. That repulses some people. The London broadcasts, on the other hand, sometimes sneak poison into the honey!"

And yet they attract listeners because Arab audiences have transcended the mentality of information officials in their countries. The people are interested in happenings because they are affected by them, and they therefore listen to international broadcasts even if they contain disinformation. Take the escalation of the crisis as an example. London broadcasts conveyed that the end of the rope was reached, that there was no way out, and that the war was only two or three days away. Some time ago they [the newscasts] said that time has run out and that it was a matter of a few hours [before war]. At one time they said that they gave him a 48-hour ultimatum, then we found out that was not true!

Exaggeration or Bellowing?

Young 'Abd-al-Rahman Ibrahim al-'Amran contributes: I follow London newscasts and some Arab broadcasts."

[AL-RIYAD] What attracts you to London?

[Al-'Amran] It is superior, and it covers most of the news. It is still the best despite the disinformation it sometimes disseminates. It offers many news reports.

[AL-RIYAD] Have you been listening to it for a long time?

[Al-'Amran] No, only recently.

Al-'Arabi al-Sayyid Badawi says: "I listen only to London and to no other broadcast because I believe it has no axe to grind. Its correspondents contribute what they learn during their efforts to cover the news, and London disseminates that in full. This is not true in the case of other broadcasts. It is my personal opinion that London is the most logical of all broadcasts. If it broadcasts disinformation, it is not done deliberately but because a particular correspondent filed his report in that fashion."

'Ali Sa'd al-Rashid says: "I listen to local broadcasts as well as to London even though the latter cannot always be believed because it exaggerates. Others, however, do not harbor such doubts!"

'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Mallah says: "I listen to local broadcasts and sometimes to London which sometimes bellows as it exaggerates the news. I now listen to its [London's] early newscasts but not to the commentaries."

TUNISIA

Status of Expatriate Community in Gulf Reviewed

91AA0062A Tunis LE TEMPS in French 22 Sep 90 p 3

[First three paragraphs are LE TEMPS introduction]

[Text] Eighty-one Tunisians coming from Iraq and Kuwait on a special flight arrived in Tunis at dawn yesterday morning.

Thus, the number of our citizens repatriated from the Gulf now totals 1,171.

Since the breaking out of the Gulf crisis on 2 August, the public has been wondering about the size of the Tunisian community in the region and the impact from this crisis on the situation of Tunisian emigres.

The emigration of Tunisians to the Gulf countries is relatively recent. In fact, it got under way modestly in 1980, and involved only certain sectors such as tourism, maintenance, transport, construction, and paramedical.

Although it has increased since 1980, the number of Tunisian immigrants to this area is still limited in relation to our community abroad as a whole, which now totals almost 530,000.

There are only 30,000 Tunisian immigrants in the Gulf, while the Tunisian community in Europe totals almost 350,000.

Increase in Number of Technical Advisers

The majority of Tunisian workers in the Gulf are located in Saudi Arabia, with a total of 18,000 residents.

The Tunisian community in Saudi Arabia is concentrated in the western part of the Kingdom, particularly at Jeddah and Medina.

On the other hand, statistics available from the Tunisian Technical Cooperation Agency indicate that 8,715 Tunisian technical advisers are currently assigned abroad, of whom 7,563 are in Gulf countries alone. According to the figures for August 1990, this total breaks down as follows: Saudi Arabia 4,515; Oman 1,449; Kuwait 491 (before the crisis); Qatar 489; UAE 304; Bahrain 123; Yemen 188; Iraq, 4.

Supplying Sectors

The education and health sectors are the largest suppliers of jobs for the Tunisian technical advisers, the former employing 2,874 teachers, and the latter 2,677 medical and paramedical staff.

One must add those who work in other sectors, in particular administration, transportation, communications, public works, electricity, mechanical engineering, and agriculture.

It should be noted that the number of technical advisers in the Gulf countries has increased steadily during the past few years, from 5,486 in 1986 to 7,481 in 1989, while the number of Tunisians working in the technical cooperation field in Europe did not exceed 82 in 1986.

Furthermore, the volume of currency transfers by Tunisians working abroad increased from 244 million dinars in 1983 to 467 million dinars in 1988.

According to the same statistical sources available at the BCT [Central Bank of Tunisia], France is the leading country of origin of these transfers, with the equivalent of 255.5 million dinars, or 63 percent of the total volume, followed by the FRG 47.6 million dinars (12 percent of the total volume), while transfers from the Arab countries in general do not exceed 6 percent, or the equivalent of 24 million dinars.

Although the size of the Tunisian community living in the Gulf countries is relatively small, it is no less important to consider the repercussions of the crisis on the members of this community.

No Social Guarantees

The authorities concerned confirm that they have made no request for repatriation from other countries of the Gulf. In fact, all those working in those countries returned to their posts after their summer vacations.

An authorized source in the office for Tunisian workers abroad explained this situation by the nature of working conditions in the centers, where one can hope to earn double or triple what one gets in Tunisia.

It should be noted, however, that on the other hand these emigres do not enjoy social benefits, other than those working in the technical adviser status, who do get the social coverage and always have the opportunity to return to their original positions in Tunisia on expiration of their contracts.

In these Gulf countries, the social security system does not extend to our citizens, unlike the situation for members of the Tunisian colony in Europe (with the exception of Switzerland) where there are bilateral agreements enabling them to benefit from social coverage.

It was to compensate for this lack that the authorities involved were forced in 1989 to initiate the "Professions Plan," which some of our compatriots working in the Gulf have joined, although in still modest numbers, it must be said. This is more regrettable since by joining the plan one automatically has the right to a retirement pension.

Reinsertion Facilities

In this connection, it should be noted that the Gulf crisis center established within the Foreign Affairs Ministry, including representatives of the Ministries of Social Affairs, Interior, Labor, and Occupational Training, as well as the Tunisian Technical Cooperation Agency and Tunis-Air, a center assigned to assist the members of our colony returning from Iraq and Kuwait, is actively working to help our compatriots repatriated from those two countries.

As for the technical advisers, they will be able to receive a public loan amounting to one-and-a-half times [their] salaries, in addition to being reintegrated into their old jobs.

Also, a special commission has been established in the consular affairs department to prepare an inventory of properties left behind by Tunisians returning from Kuwait.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Salih Asked to Address Questions on Crisis

91AE0029E London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
13 Oct 90 p 8

[Article by 'Abdallah Hasan al-'Ansi: "Yemeni Citizen Addresses 10 Questions to Lieutenant General 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih"]

[Text] I hope that President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih is tolerant enough to hear a word of truth from one of his citizens—a word that represents the "counter opinion" on the issue of the hour throughout the world, namely the issue of the Iraqi forces' occupation of the fraternal State of Kuwait, especially since the president frequently advocates the need to listen to the "counter opinion" on all issues that concern the country and the citizen. His current position toward the issue of the occupation of Kuwait is unjust, strange, and odd.

It is unjust because it sides glaringly with the oppressor against the oppressed.

It is strange because it does not reflect the ethics with which the Yemenis are raised, the loyalty for which they

are known, or the chivalry that is part of their character. It does not reflect their interests that must be preserved.

His position of alignment with Saddam's aggression against the fraternal Kuwait has offended us, we the Yemenis, most severely before offending the Gulf citizens in general and Kuwait's citizens in particular. Whether in our country or in the diaspora, we, the Yemenis, are now viewed as ingrates who disavow good deeds and who are swept by the clamor of propaganda and by political demagoguery without considering the crux of the issue, the basis of the problem, and the cause of the dilemma being experienced by the region. Because of this, we feel shameful and disgraced.

What makes matters worse is that the president's media does not permit anybody to express his opinion on the developments being undergone by the region if this opinion disagrees with or criticizes some aspects of the official position. Matters are such that the political observer may imagine that the government's declared position in our country reflects the popular will whereas this position reflects in fact the position of a clique of opportunists whose interests are tied to the interests of the ruling party in Baghdad.

On the basis of the above, I hope that President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih will permit me to address the following questions to him:

1. Is it fair to support the aggressor against the victim, the oppressor against the oppressed, and the criminal against the victim?

2. Is it loyal to stand against the government, people, and soil of Kuwait? How could your various information media focus their entire attention on the foreign presence in the region as the main problem while ignoring the cause leading to this foreign presence, meaning the Iraqi forces' invasion of the small and peaceable State of Kuwait and the serious consequences of this invasion, such as the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq, the bloodshed, the violation of honor, the plundering of wealth, the terrifying of peaceful citizens, the destruction of installations, and the displacement of families?

The entire world is aware that the foreign forces arrived in the area only as a consequence of Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. So by what logic do the president's media focus on the effect and ignore the cause?

In addition to general reason, there is a special reason that dictates that the Yemeni Government support Kuwait in its ordeal. I mean by this reason the Kuwaiti Government's and people's material and moral support and aid for Yemen since the inception of the 26 September 1962 revolution and until Saddam's aggression against Kuwait. We are all aware that Kuwait was one of the first countries to recognize Yemen's republican regime and the first country in the world to set up a development project bureau in Yemen where it has built tens of schools, mosques, and hospitals in various parts of Yemen. Kuwait also founded Sanaa University and

took care of its expenditures since it was established in 1970. The latest gigantic development project set up by Kuwait is the School of Medicine which has been built according to the latest style. We are all aware that the Sanaa-Ma'rib highway which linked central Yemen with east Yemen for the first time with a modern asphalted road was built at the expense of the State of Kuwait.

Moreover, did not the Kuwaiti Government play the major role in the truce between the two parts of Yemen when war erupted between them in 1979? Didn't you and 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il go to Kuwait where you signed the "Kuwait Agreement" which spared Yemeni blood and healed the rift between the Yemenis?

3. Is it wise to take toward the Kuwait issue a position which, in addition to being wrong, leads to damaging the interests of 2 million Yemeni expatriates in the Gulf states who earn their living, support their families, and supply Yemen's economy with the hard currency it most direly needs?

The presence of a Ministry of Expatriate Affairs is meaningless if you are going to embrace an unwise foreign policy that leads to damaging the Yemeni interests at the domestic and foreign levels and that makes the Yemeni expatriate feel uncertain of his position and of the care he is given by his government and by its representatives abroad.

4. Is it smart to organize demagogic demonstrations that burn and destroy all that pertains to our brothers and neighbors just because you disagree with them in opinion on the Kuwait problem? Your information media even announce the demonstrations in advance and invite the citizens and the civil servants to join them.

Why all this and for whose sake?

Is it for Saddam who has become addicted to bloodshed, to igniting wars, and to attacking neighbors, keeping in mind that he has not fired a single bullet at Israel?

5. Is it an act of good advice and of loyalty to the Yemeni people to expose their economy to the dangers of collapse and to deprive the Yemeni people of their essential food by sending what little supplies are available in our country to Iraq on the pretext of humanitarian motives and of the Arab sense of honor that dictated to you not to stand idle in the face of the "conspiracy" to starve Iraq's children?

God be praised! Aren't you thus starving Yemen's children who are poorer and needier than Iraq's children who have been starved by none other than Saddam with his foolish policy and his stupid actions?

6. Is it politically wise to recognize the principle of the strong's invasion of the weak, as the Iraqi regime has done with the State of Kuwait? Would you accept such a principle if a strong country invaded Yemen, expelled its rulers, displaced its people, and seized its funds and its institutions, regardless of the justifications cited for such an invasion?

7. Is it chivalrous to black out the heinous crimes committed by Saddam's army against the Kuwaiti brothers in Kuwait and against other residents there—crimes that include murder, terrifying peaceful people, rape, and looting—while you and your media content yourselves with shedding crocodile's tears for Iraq's children and ignoring Kuwait's children as if they were not human?

8. Is it at all ethical to condone the detention of innocent foreign hostages, including women and children, and their use as a means to exert pressure and to blackmail in order to pass over the aggression, to force the world community to accept the fait accompli, and to prevent rescuing Kuwait from Saddam's talons?

9. Is it diplomatic to stand against the will of the international community that has condemned the aggression and demanded elimination of all the traces emanating from it, to be clearly aligned with Saddam Husayn, and to depict our country as a country straying from the international consensus that seeks withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from sisterly Kuwait, the restoration of its legitimate government, and the repatriation of the Kuwaiti people in their country with honor and dignity?

10. Is it in Yemen's and the Arab and Islamic nation's interest to move the Yemeni armed forces to the Saudi borders and to receive Iraqi forces in order that they may pose a threat to the neighbors who have done us favors for a long time and in an attempt to stab these neighbors in the back in response to Saddam's schemes? Isn't the bloody wound that Saddam has inflicted on the Arab nation's body enough in order that you may try to inflict further wounds? Don't you fear, as Yemen's sages fear, that any gamble of the sort may lead to the outbreak in Yemen of a new civil war that will sweep away many of the gains and accomplishments made for our people after great efforts and immense sacrifices?

Returning to the truth is better than persisting in falsehood. It is manly and brave to acknowledge a mistake and to be prepared to correct it. I hope that you are such a man.

Peasants Protest Changes in Agricultural Reform

91P40042A Aden SAWT AL-'UMMAL in Arabic
4 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by 'Umar Sa'id]

[Text] Hadramawt—Yesterday morning hundreds of peasants from different Hadramawt provinces demonstrated, carrying signs and shouting repeatedly, calling for the realization of their demands to keep land, to not relinquish it and give up ownership, and for protection of their established gains and implementation of the agrarian reform and tenure law.

The march headed toward the executive office headquarters of the local Peoples Council after passing the Party

Headquarters and the headquarters of the General Peoples Congress, and they delivered a memorandum containing their positions and demands for solving the agricultural question.

Also, authorities in Saywun held a meeting dedicated to discussing the agricultural committee's plan. Working

subcommittees were formed, among them a special committee for limiting state and religious endowment [awqaf] property.

The demonstrators also organized a gathering for Land Day, which is next Sunday, on 7 October.

IRAN

President Pledges Support for Islamic Movement in Sudan*91AS0108F Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
4 Oct 90 p 13*

[Text] Tehran—ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY:

Colonel Sulayman Muhammad Sulayman, a member of the Sudanese leadership council, met with Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani yesterday morning and delivered a written message from the Sudanese president to our country's president.

At this meeting, the member of the Sudanese leadership council pointed out the significant role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in guiding the Islamic nations and said: We are well aware of the fact that from the very beginning the Islamic revolution has been faced with many dangers such as the economic, political, and propaganda sanctions; however, by relying on Islamic principles and assistance from the Almighty God the revolution met with victory.

The member of the Sudanese leadership council, further added: We consider the Islamic Republic of Iran as the hope and bulwark of the Islamic nations and a harbinger for bringing to victory the efforts of the oppressed people.

Continuing, he offered our president a report concerning the Sudanese internal situation and discussed the imperialist plots and revolts occurring in the southern region of that country and said: Right now, in Sudan we are facing the same types of blockades as the ones which were experienced by the Islamic revolution, however with the help of Almighty God, with the victory of Islam we will eventually become victorious as well. In conclusion, he expressed his desire for further cooperation between the two countries of Iran and Sudan.

Thereafter, Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the president, while expressing his thanks for the message of the Sudanese president and voicing his satisfaction for the ever-growing process of cooperation between the two Muslim countries of Iran and Sudan, stated: We were familiar with the Sudanese government even before the advent of the revolution and we've always wished to be able to continue our cooperation with that Muslim nation.

Pointing out the southern Sudanese revolts, our country's president called this a fight between Islam and blasphemy, and thereby announced the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the Islamic movement in Sudan. Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani further added: For the sake of God and discerning the expedience of Islam, the Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to help the Sudanese Muslims.

Here it should be noted that Mr. Torkan, the minister of defense and armed forces logistics, was also present at this meeting.

Esfahan Steel Mill Output To Increase*91AS0228E Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English
3 Nov 90 p 2*

[Text] Moscow (IRNA)—Iran and the Soviet Union signed a protocol here Wednesday with Moscow [as published] agreeing to boost production capacity of the Esfahan Steel Mill to 1.9 million tons a year, within six months.

The protocol was signed by the visiting Iranian Minister of Mines and Metals Mohammad Hoseyn Mahluji and the Soviet Minister of Metallurgy Serafin Kolpakov.

The Soviet party also agreed to sell Iran 500,000 tons of iron ore concentrates and 500,000 tons of iron ore annually.

The two countries are also to cooperate in implementation of an alumina project in Iran's Qeshm Island, at the Hormuz Strait.

Mahluji, who arrived here last Sunday, also inspected Leningrad Vami research institute. In talks with Vami Officials he discussed its cooperation with the Iranian institutes.

The two sides voiced readiness to exploit mines in northern Iran and execute alumina and aluminium production projects at Qeshm Island.

All Doctors Required To Serve in Deprived Villages*91AS0190G Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Oct 90 p 2*

[Text] Sari—KEYHAN correspondent:

All medical graduates in the country are required to serve in deprived villages.

Dr. Malekzadeh, the educational affairs deputy minister of health, treatment, and medical education, who had traveled to Sari to take part in the commencement ceremonies of the new academic year for the students of medical sciences in Mazandaran, made this statement.

He said: Based on a bill which has now been ratified in the second round of discussions in the Majles, all graduates of medical fields, which are under the control of the Ministry of Health and Treatment, will be obligated to spend their period of military service in the deprived villages of the country. He added: With this step, 1,000 doctors shall be added to the present system of the country within the next two years.

The educational affairs deputy of the Ministry of Health and Treatment referred to raising the capacity for the admission to the universities to 3,500 per year and pointed out that at the present time, 28 medical schools with 28,000 students are active.

He added: In order to eliminate the shortage of professors, within the next three years 2,000 professors will be added to the faculties of universities, in which case the number of professors of medical schools will reach 6,000.

Dr. Malekzadeh then referred to the new plan ratified by the Majles concerning mandatory retraining of doctors and added: If this plan, which will be implemented this year, is not carried out by physicians, their medical license will not be renewed.

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